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I. INTRODUCTION
As a general matter, the law encourages parties to resolve their
differences privately and to resort to litigation only as a last recourse.
Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. B.A., 1974, Glassboro
State College; J.D., 1981, Villanova University School of Law. The author wishes
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This policy applies perhaps most appropriately in the context of do-
mestic relations.' Assuming two people can negotiate in a reasonable
manner, we can certainly expect that the agreement they strike will
be tailored more closely to their own individual circumstances, and
thus, preferable to any which might be imposed by a judge who is a
stranger to them and their relationship.2 Settlement reached by con-
sensus offers a greater probability of compliance by the parties.3 Fur-
ther, private settlement avoids the highly disruptive and painful
experience of the public adversarial process which can greatly harm
the parties and, more important, their children.4
1. Gertrude L.Q. v. Stephen P.Q., 466 A.2d 1213, 1216 (Del. Super. Ct. 1983); Sutter v.
Sutter, 61 Ill. App. 3d 201, 204, 377 N.E.2d 862, 864 (1978); Kline v. Kline, 92 Mich.
App. 62, 78, 284 N.W.2d 488, 495 (1979); D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 200 N.J. Super.
361, 366, 491 A.2d 752, 755 (1985); White v. White, 141 Vt. 499, 502, 450 A.2d 1108,
1110 (1982); Parra v. Parra, 1 Va. App. 118, 128, 336 S.E.2d 157, 162 (1985); N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAw § 236 practice commentary at 226 (McKinney 1986); UNIF. MAR-
RIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT (UMDA) § 306 & comment, 9A U.L.A. 216 (1987); H.
CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 18.8, at 783 (2d ed.
1988). See Note, Modifcation of Spousal Support A Survey of a Confusing Area
of the Law, 17 J. FAM. L. 711, 715 (1979). But cf Sharp, Fairness Standards and
Separation Agreements: A Word of Caution on Contractual Freedom, 132 U. PA.
L. REv. 1399, 1405 (194)(contract doctrines fail in the divorce context to provide
adequate safeguards against unfair results and procedures).
2. Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 154, 416 A.2d 45, 53 (1980); White v. White, 144 Vt. 499,
502, 450 A.2d 1108, 1110 (1982); Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 957 (1979).
3. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 956-57; J. BLADES, FAMILY MEDIATION:
COOPERATIVE DIVORCE SErLEMENT 10-11 (1985). Noncompliance with the con-
tinuing obligations of child support and spousal maintenance and the difficulties
of enforcement raise some of the most troublesome issues in the area of family
law. Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of
Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1181, 1253-58
(1981); see also Chambers, Men Who Know They Are Watched.- Some Benefits and
Costs of Jailing for Nonpayment of Support, 75 MICH. L. REV. 900, 900-01, 927-33,
936-37 (1977); Mnookin, Review: Using Jail for Child Support Enforcement, 48 U.
CHI. ] . REV. 338, 338-40, 369 (1981) [hereinafter Mnookin].
4. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 236 (McKinney 1986). See J. BLADES, supra note 3, at 1-5,
10-11, 26-31. It should be noted that litigation does not corner the market on de-
structiveness in the divorce context. Negotiation, whether it involves economic
issues or matters relating to child custody, visitation or support, can be difficult as
well. "[A]ll too often the adversary bent of the law and the psychologically unso-
phisticated perspective of many of the lawyers, in combination with the emo-
tional turmoil of the clients, produces a negotiating process of which nobody can
be proud." K. KRESSEL, THE PROCESS OF DIVORCE: How PROFESSIONALS AND
COUPLES NEGOTIATE SETTLEMENTS 4 (1985); Sharp, supra note 1, at 1428. How-
ever, it seems clear that as bad as negotiations might be in some cases, they are
unlikely to be worse than a knock-down-drag-out court battle, held in public, and




A. Sources of Problems
However, contracts executed between spouses, even soon-to-be-ex-
spouses, cannot simply be lumped together with arm's length business
contracts. They are different.5 The confidential nature of the rela-
tionship, the emotional trauma that dissolution of a marriage will have
on the contracting spouses, and the very real policy interests of the
state counsel against absolute freedom of contract.6 This is especially
true regarding provisions for children.7 But even when the bargain
involves only obligations of spousal support or division of property be-
tween spouses, absolute freedom of contract might not be appropriate.
Some commentators have suggested that the no-fault divorce revolu-
tion and its emphasis on or perhaps, assumption of equality, rather
than contributing to women's equality, instead has contributed to the
feminization of poverty.8
This tension between commitment to principles of freedom of con-
tract and to those of protecting public policy interests by regulating
contracting between spouses has caused both courts and legislatures to
equivocate. Thus, the law of contracting between spouses has evolved
as an ambiguous body of decisions that provides precious little gui-
dance to lawyers and laypersons attempting to guide and direct their
affairs.9
While true to some extent across the entire landscape of domestic
relations contracting, the confusion and its impact are most acute
when dealing with the question of whether an agreement entered
prior to a divorce merges into the subsequent divorce decree, survives
as an independent contract, or evolves into some combination of both.
Questions arise regarding the effect of incorporation by reference, ap-
proval or ratification of the agreement by the divorce court, merger,
and the effect of such actions by the court upon later modifiability and
available remedies.' 0
Some suggest that the problem is exacerbated in this context by
5. Sharp, supra note 1, at 1405,1442, 1459; UMDA § 306 & comment, 9A U.L.A. 216
(1987). See also Pennise v. Pernise, 120 Misc. 2d 782, 784, 466 N.Y.S.2d 631, 633,
(Sup. Ct. 1983); H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 18.8, at 783.
6. See Sharp, supra note 1, at 1406. The author observes that "[tihere are inherent,
perhaps even irreconcilable, conflicts between the sharing and the altruistic ide-
ologies that are the foundation for the traditional family structure and the indi-
vidualistic and competitive principles of the marketplace... outside the family."
Id. at 1399. See J. BLADES, supra note 3, at 1-4, 19, 22, 26.
7. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
8. See generally L. WErrZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SO-
CIAL AND ECONOMIc CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILREN IN AMERICA 160,
183, 340-43, 350-56 (1985) [hereinafter L. WEITZMAN, DIVORCE REvoLUTION];
Sharp, supra note 1, at 1407 (citing Weitzman, supra note 3, at 1252-53).
9. See H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 18.8, at 781-83.
10. In re Marriage of Forum, 145 Cal. App. 3d 599, 600-01, 193 Cal. Rptr. 596, 596
(1983); Phillips v. Phillips, 93 Idaho 384, 386-87, 462 P.2d 49, 51-52 (1969); Moseley
19s8
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courts engaging in manipulation of rules in such a way as to achieve
desired, and arguably equitable results in sympathetic cases. 1 In one
case involving questions of incorporation and merger and the resulting
impact on modifiability, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
acknowledged that "[a] great deal of incomprehensible domestic rela-
tions law in the [s]tate... hinges upon the technicality of whether a
property settlement has been 'ratified and confirmed' by a court... or,
alternatively, whether provisions of a property settlement are
'merged' into the divorce decree."12 The court observed that "[i]n an-
swering the question presented by the case before us any one of nu-
merous results could be justified by relying upon . . .precedent." 13
The opinion then observed:
Our law is replete with interesting rules which can be manipulated in such a
way as to permit a court to arrive at any desired result in a case of this nature.
We suspect that previous cases have manipulated these rules in such a way as
to arrive at equitable results in those cases; however, the effect of that manip-
ulation process has been untoward with regard to the degree of certainty with
which our law can be predicted.1 4
To be sure, not all judges will be as candid as Justice Neeley, the
author of the West Virginia opinion. However, the problems in inter-
preting questions of merger and incorporation certainly exist and have
been recognized beyond the borders of West Virginia.15
Putting aside for the moment the debate as to how unfettered the
right to contract should be in the domestic relations context, the prop-
osition that agreement is preferable to a court battle cannot be denied.
The law, therefore, should encourage parties to reach agreement be-
v. Mosier, 279 S.C. 348, 352, 306 S.E.2d 624, 626 (1983); In re Estate of Hereford,
250 S.E.2d 45, 49 (W. Va. 1978). See H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 18.8, at 783-84.
11. In re Estate of Hereford, 250 S.E.2d 45, 49 (1978).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 50.
14. Id. at 49. In a footnote, Justice Neely elaborated:
Our previous cases on the relation between property settlement agree-
ments and subsequent alimony decrees provide something for everyone;
confusion rather than clear guidance has been our most liberally gener-
ated product in this area and this writer acknowledges that he is as much
if not more, a part of that unfortunate development as any of his illustri-
ous predecessors.
I&L n.1. The court concluded that, given the tradition described above and "the
pathetic facts before" it, application of an equitable approach was "perfectly
proper." Id. at 49. However, the court went on to "disengage [itself] from the
mire" and set out explicit rules to be applied prospectively to all property settle-
ment agreements entered into in the state. Id. at 51; see infra notes 60-64 and
accompanying text.
15. See cases cited supra note 10. See also I. ELLmAN, P. KuRTz, & A. STANTON, FAM-
ILY LAw 730 (1986)("[t]he causes and consequences of the merger of the separa-
tion agreement into the divorce decree are undoubtedly the single most confused
area of divorce procedure").
[Vol. 67:235
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tween themselves, subject to whatever restrictions are appropriate.1 6
Unpredictability regarding how agreements will be interpreted and
enforced does not entice parties to attempt to resolve the details of
their divorce, but rather drives them and their lawyers away from set-
tlement. Worse, the chaotic state of affairs frequently traps the un-
wary who bargain away rights in good faith upon a given
understanding of the law and the incidents of their agreement, only to
find later that the state of affairs was not what it had seemed, and that
the presumptions upon which they had negotiated were illusory.17
In this area, perhaps more than any other, unpredictability acts as
a serious disincentive to parties negotiating agreements. By their na-
ture, divorce settlement agreements usually cover a much longer term
than other contracts. This further emphasizes the need for certainty
in how courts, faced with challenges to such agreements long after
their execution, will interpret them. To the extent lawyers and lay
persons cannot discern whether and how they may make an agree-
ment entered at divorce binding and nonmodifiable, and whether and
how they may provide for an agreement to survive entry of the divorce
decree or in the alternative to be merged into it, they are discouraged
from negotiating agreements.18
The imprecise use of language by lawyers, judges, and legislators
causes at least some of the uncertainty in this area. Terms of art are
used loosely and carelessly.19 The meanings ascribed to the words in-
corporation, merger, approval, ratification, and confirmation will be
taken up in the substantive analysis of this article. However, as a pre-
liminary matter it would help to clarify another area of definitional
confusion. Judges, lawyers, and legislators use a number of terms in-
terchangeably to refer to the various sorts of agreements a divorcing
couple might enter. Property agreement, separation agreement, con-
sent decree, settlement agreement, property settlement agreement,
and others are used with little precision or consistency. "Divorce set-
tlement agreement" will be used in this article to identify a contract
between married persons contemplating or in the process of divorce
which embodies their agreement on spousal maintenance, property di-
vision, child support, child custody, and child visitation.20 The lan-
16. See infra notes 21-33 and accompanying text.
17. Cf. Moseley v. Mosier, 279 S.C. 348, 353, 306 S.E.2d 624, 626 (1983)(terms of art
used in agreement without intending or implying any particular legal conse-
quence which courts later impose on unsuspecting parties); In re Estate of Here-
ford, 250 S.E.2d 45, 50 (W. Va. 1978) ("[a]ny one of numerous results could be
justified by relying upon our prior precedent").
18. See H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 18.8, at 783.
19. See eg., Phillips v. Phillips, 93 Idaho 384,386-87,462 P.2d 49, 51 (1969); Moseley v.
Mosier, 279 S.C. 348, 352, 306 S.E.2d 624, 626; In re Estate of Hereford, 250 S.E.2d
45, 49-50 n.1 (W. Va. 1978). See also infra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
20. See Sharp, supra note 1, at 1399 n.2. See also A. LINDEY & L. PARLEY, SEPARA-
1988]
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guage used by the particular court, however, will be used in explaining
and analyzing specific cases.
This article will focus specifically on questions surrounding incor-
poration, merger, and survival of divorce settlement agreements. It
will first survey the approaches taken in a representative sample of
jurisdictions, analyzing their effectiveness. The article will then sug-
gest some conclusions regarding the problems with these approaches,
and finally propose a workable model.
B. General Principles
Traditional barriers to contracts between spouses fell in the nine-
teenth century with universal passage of Married Women's Property
Acts.2 ' However, although spouses were able to contract with one an-
TION AGREEMENTS AND ANTE-NUPTIAL CoNTRAcTs § 3.01, at 3-4 (rev. ed. 1988).
The term separation agreement, in its true sense, refers to a contract between a
husband and wife detailing their agreement to live separately. Sharp, supra note
1, at 1399 n.1. However, the term is frequently employed to identify what is being
called a divorce settlement agreement in this article. Smith v. Smith, 439 So. 2d
1206 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983)(providing for child support and educational expenses);
East v. East, 395 So. 2d 78 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981)(providing for custody, alimony,
division of personalty, and conveyance of realty to child of marriage); Sinn v.
Sinn, 696 P.2d 333 (Colo. 1985)(providing for maintenance of spouse and property
division); Solis v. Tea, 468 A.2d 1276 (Del. 1983)(providing for alimony, child sup-
port, private school and college tuition, and children's medical expenses); Rand v.
Rand, 18 Ohio St. 3d 356, 481 N.E.2d 609 (1985)(providing for child support and
college expenses and covenanting to provide religious education with reimburse-
ment of related expenses thereof for custodial parent). Similarly, the phrase
"property settlement" is employed by some to distinguish agreements which deal
with real and personal property rights at the time of divorce from those agree-
ments which also provide for traditionally modifiable items such as spousal main-
tenance, child support, child custody, and visitation. Tucker v. Tucker, 416 So. 2d
1053 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982)(making the distinction between agreements in which
parties intend to execute integrated bargains and those which merely provide for
statutorily modifiable alimony); Gubser v. Gubser, 126 Ariz. 303, 614 P.2d 845
(1980)(using the terms "separation settlement" and "property settlement" non-
interchangeably); Meehan v. Meehan, 425 N.E.2d 157 (Ind. 1981)(specifically no-
tice that caption of "Property Settlement" for agreement dealing with child cus-
tody and support is misnomer). Cf. McInturff v. McInturff, 7 Ark. App. 116, 644
S.W.2d 618 (1983)(distinguishing between property and support settlements).
Others, however, use that term more generally to refer to that which is being
called a divorce settlement agreement in this article. Compton v. Compton, 101
Idaho 328, 612 P.2d 1175 (1980)(including child custody as well as distribution of
property with an eye towards providing custodian-father with a greater share of
community property for child support purposes); Esserman v. Esserman, 136 Cal.
App. 3d 576, 186 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1982)(providing for spousal and child support as
well as division of property); Young v. Burkholder, 142 Ariz. 415, 690 P.2d 134 (Ct.
App. 1984)(including child support and college expenses as well). Similarly, the
terms "settlement agreement," "post-nuptial agreement," and "consent decree"
are used with little precision.
21. In our history married women could not contract with their spouses because a
woman, during coverture, lacked the legal capacity to contract with anyone, and
[Vol. 67:235
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other, they were not granted absolute freedom, at least with respect to
matters relating to their marriage. Two restrictions were imposed:
spouses could not enter a contract that would alter the essential ele-
ments of the marital relationship;22 and spouses could not enter a con-
tract that would encourage divorce.23 Public policies justifying these
restrictions changed as greater equality between the sexes was
achieved, and greater freedom to divorce was granted. The states,
thus, began to limit application of even these restrictions.24 However,
they did not completely abandon supervisory involvement in divorce,
but rather, "again reaccommodated their own interests, and those of
private parties, in controlling the consequences of dissolution." 25 The
general rule now is that spouses may contract regarding the incidents
of marriage if their agreements are fair, just, and reasonable consider-
ing all the circumstances, which will include the presence of a confi-
because of operation of the doctrine that the husband and wife were one person
in the law, and a one party contract, like one hand clapping, was an impossibility.
A. LINDEY & L. PARLEY, supra note 20, at § 3.02, 3-8 to 3-9; L. WEITZMAN, THE
MARRIAGE CoNTRAcr, SpousEs, LovERs AND THE LAw 338 (1981) [hereinafter L.
WEITZMAN, MARRIAGE CONTRACT]. However, universal adoption of Married Wo-
men's Property Acts in the nineteenth century granted women the power to con-
tract in general, including, with some restrictions, the capacity to contract with
their husbands. The Acts also brought the demise of the concept of unity of iden-
tity within marriage. Id. See also Sharp, supra note 1, at 1399-1403; H. CLARK,
supra note 1, § 7.2, at 289-90.
22. Sharp, supra note 1, at 1400. While a definitive statement of what constitutes
"the essentials of marriage" is beyond the scope of this article, courts consistently
considered the duty of support and the duty to render domestic services as essen-
tial obligations. L. WErizMAN, DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 8, at 338.
23. Sharp, supra note 1, at 1400; L. WErrzmAN, DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 8, at
338. It should be noted that under traditional fault-based divorce laws, collusion
was a defense that would require the court to deny a divorce. H. CLARK, supra
note 1, § 13.9, at 522-25. Thus, under fault systems, to the extent that a divorce
settlement agreement appeared to condition a financial reward upon obtaining a
divorce, or appeared to cross the line from civilized ordering of affairs into collu-
sion (a difficult line to draw), the divorce could be denied by the court, and the
agreement would be void. Id. See also Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 2, at
952-53. As divorce settlement agreements met with increasing favor, jurisdictions
modified this position. For example, Vermont's divorce law specifically provides
that "collusion" as used in divorce actions should not be construed to include set-
tlement negotiations. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 553 (1974).
24. Sharp, supra note 1, at 1400-01. Professor Sharp explains:
[Restrictions centered on the state's interest in maintaining the status
quo of marriage, and thereby the hierarchical relationship of the parties
to marriage, with the result that limitations on interspousal freedom to
contract became identified with perpetuation of inequality between the
sexes. It therefore followed that the movement toward greater equality
between the sexes was accompanied by demands for decreased state in-
tervention in the regulation of marriage and divorce and the parties'
freedom to contract regarding either.
Id (footnotes omitted).
25. Sharp, supra note 1, at 1401.
19881
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dential relationship between the spouses and the possibility of
overreaching. 26
While the parties may be granted some control over determination
of rights and obligations between themselves, even to the point of con-
tracting out of certain of the general principles, this does not hold for
provisions relating to children. Child support, child custody, and visi-
tation are always subject to the scrutiny of the court and open to modi-
fication, and the parents cannot contract away the child's right to
support, nor can they limit the court's jurisdiction with respect to
these matters.27
Thus, while the law seems to be encouraging in some cases, and in
others, at least accepting divorce agreements, in many instances, the
agreement will be subject to judicial supervision or some sort of judi-
cial review.28
Much of the confusion in the area of enforcement of divorce agree-
ments arises from the tension between evolving principles of freedom
of contract as applied to domestic relations matters29 and traditional
principles of public policy and state interest in marriage, divorce, and
its incidents which militate in favor of various levels of state involve-
ment. The result is either studied ambiguity by courts and legislatures
on the question of divorce contracting, or worse, unpredictable invoca-
tion of "equitable principles" and public policy arguments in cases in
which the facts are compelling. Both results contribute to the devel-
opment as an irreconcilable body of case law.3 0
The traditional rules regarding modification of domestic relations
awards cause further complications. An award of periodic alimony 31 is
26. Id. For a survey of representative state standards of review, see id. at 1408 nn.3 5-
37.
27. See UMDA § 306 (f), 9A U.L.A. 217 (1987); H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 18.8, at 780-
81.
28. Sharp, supra note 1, at 1401. See also Note, supra note 1, at 715; Annotation,
Divorce: Power of Court to Modify Decree for Alimony or Support of Spouse
Which Was Based on Agreement of Parties, 61 A.L.R.3d 520, 525 (1975); H. Fos-
TER, JR. & R. BROWN, CONTEMPORARY MATRIMONIAL LAW IssuEs: A GUIDE TO
DIVORCE ECONOMICS & PRACTICE 689 (1985). Many states statutorily provide for
separation agreements, and specify, in that legislation, whether judicial approval
is required, and the standard that will be applied. For a survey of such statutory
provisions, see Sharp, supra note 1, at 1408 nn.35-37. It should be noted, however,
that Professor Sharp argues that judicial review requirements are ineffective. Id.
at 1409, 1442-51.
29. Indeed, some argue for even greater freedom of contract. See Schultz, Contract
Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 204 (1982);
L. WEITzmAN, MARRIAGE CONTRACT, supra note 21; Mnookin & Kornhauser,
supra note 2. For a contrary view, see Sharp, supra note 1.
30. See, e.g., Moseley v. Mosier, 279 S.C. 348, 352-53, 306 S.E.2d 624, 627 (1983); In re
Estate of Hereford, 250 S.E.2d 45, 49-52 (W. Va. 1978); L. WErrZMAN, MARRIAGE
CONTRACT, supra note 21, at 342.
31. Periodic alimony should be distinguished from lump sum alimony. The distinc-
[Vol. 67:235
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generally modifiable by a court upon a showing by one of the parties of
materially changed circumstances.3 2 In contrast, however, contracts
are not modifiable by one party or by the court at the behest of one
party, other than in certain extraordinary circumstances. 33
tion, however, is not always clear- periodic alimony is spousal support; while
lump sum alimony is usually a property distribution and a non-modifiable obliga-
tion, despite the fact that it may be payable in installments. Stone v. Stone, 254
Ga. 519, 520, 330 S.E.2d 887, 888 (1985); Oknaian v. Oknaian, 90 Mich. App. 28, 36-
37,282 N.W.2d 230, 234 (1979) (reviewing relevant Michigan law); White v. White,
296 N.C. 661, 666-67, 252 S.E.2d 698, 701 (1979); H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 16.5, at
657-58.
Complications of course arise. For example, an award that is intended by the
court and the parties to be spousal support, may be set as a specified amount,
payable in installments over time, and thus appear more like a lump sum prop-
erty award. Stebbins v. Stebbins, 435 So. 2d 383, 385 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); H.
CLARK, supra note 1, § 16.4, at 653-54.
The distinction must be made, however, since property awards, as contrasted
with alimony, are final, and not modifiable. Cf In re Marriage of Smiley, 53 Cal.
App. 3d 228,232,125 Cal. Rptr. 717, 719 (1975)(distinctions made between awards
for support/alimony and those given in consideration for other promises); White
v. White, 296 N.C. 661, 666-67, 252 SXE.2d, 698, 701 (1979); H. CLARK, supra note 1,
§ 18.8, at 780.
32. H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 16.5, at 655-56. Many states provide for modification
and enunciate the applicable standard statutorily. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 1519 (1986)(a decree ordering alimony may be modified only upon showing of
real and substantial change of circumstances and will be terminated upon death
of either party or upon remarriage by party receiving alimony); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 61.14 (West Supp. 1988)(courts have continuing jurisdiction to modify orders or
separation agreements as equity requires, with due regard to changed circum-
stances or financial ability of parties); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-17 (Burns
1987)(modification of order for maintenance shall be made only upon showing of
changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make terms unreason-
able); Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.370 (1987)(provisions of maintenance decree may be
modified only upon a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and con-
tinuing as to make terms unreasonable, considering the financial resources of
both parties, including extent to which reasonable expenses of either party are, or
should be, shared by spouse or other person with whom he or she cohabits, and
earning capacity of a party who is not employed; obligation to pay future statu-
tory maintenance is terminated upon death of either party or remarriage of party
receiving maintenance); NEv. REV. STAT. § 125.150 (1986)(decree may be modified
upon showing of changed circumstances, whether or not court has expressly re-
tained jurisdiction to modify); WIs. STAT. § 767.32 (1985-86)(court may from time
to time, on petition of either parties or of department of health and social services
revise and alter judgment respecting amount of maintenance except when judg-
ment waived maintenance payments; receipt of aid to families with dependent
children or substantial change in cost of living of either party or as measured by
Federal Bureau of Labor statistics is sufficient to justify revision of judgment
except that change in obligor's cost of living not sufficient if payments are ex-
pressed as percentages of income).
33. See In re Marriage of Kloster, 127 Ill. App. 3d 583, 585, 469 N.E.2d 381, 383
(1984)(property settlements set aside upon proof of fraud, duress, or variance
with public policy); McGowan v. McGowan, 663 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Ky. 1983)(agree-
ment set aside upon showing of overreaching and undue influence by wife); In re
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Thus, tension develops between the underlying contract and do-
mestic relations principles, tension that causes vacillation by courts,
and a resulting lack of clarity in the law. Questions of characteriza-
tion and intent, always ripe for manipulation, become the determina-
tive factors.
II. THE AGREEMENT AS IT RELATES
TO THE DIVORCE DECREE
Whether the agreement of the parties has merged into the court's
decree, remains as an independent contract, or evolves as some hybrid
presents the major question to be addressed. However, it is not possi-
ble to separate completely this issue from the other important ques-
tion, that is, what result the status of the agreement (merged,
independent, or hybrid) will have. It may be necessary to determine
whether, and to what extent, merger has occurred in order to decide
whether the court may modify a provision for spousal maintenance; 34
whether the provision can be enforced with the specialized remedies
of, for example, contempt and garnishment of wages;35 whether an ac-
tion on the contract will lie;36 and whether contract defenses apply or
are barred.3 7 Depending on the circumstances, the availability of a
contract remedy or defense as opposed to a judgment remedy or de-
fense can make a crucial difference in the outcome of the case.
When the spouses contemplating a divorce have entered an agree-
ment, three possibilities arise regarding the nature of that contract.3 8
First, the independent agreement permits the parties to enter an
agreement which ordinarily must be presented to the divorce court for
approval. The agreement, however, is not set out by the court, or ac-
Marriage of Madden, 683 P.2d 493, 495 (Mont. 1984)(settlement agreement modi-
fied and marital property redistributed upon showing of "extrinsic" fraud on part
of husband). In addition to these basic contract principles, unilateral modifica-
tion by the court raises questions concerning violation of the constitutional prohi-
bition against the state impairing private contracts. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 2.
See, e.g., Frizzell v. Bartley, 372 So. 2d 1371, 1372 (Fla. 1979); Shoosmith v. Scott,
217 Va. 789, 793, 232 S.E.2d 787, 789 (1977)(statute permitting modification is not
unconstitutional because contract was entered into subsequent to enactment of
statute and thus modification is deemed to have been contemplated by parties).
34. See, e.g., Flynn v. Flynn, 42 Cal. 2d 55, 57, 265 P.2d 865, 866 (1954); Solis v. Tea, 468
A.2d 1276 (Del. 1983); H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 18.8, at 780.
35. See, e.g., Flynn v. Flynn, 42 Cal. 2d 52, 58, 265 P.2d 865, 866 (1954); Hollman v.
Hollman, 347 Pa. Super. 289, 300-01, 500 A.2d 837, 842-43 (1985).
36. See, e.g., Flynn v. Flynn, 42 Cal. 2d 52, 58, 265 P.2d 865, 866 (1954).
37. Sharp, supra note 1, at 1410; Johnston v. Johnston, 297 Md. 48, 56-57, 465 A.2d 436,
442 (1983).
38. See, e.g., Johnston v. Johnston, 297 Md. 48, 56, 465 A.2d 436, 440 (1983); Davis v.
Davis, 687 S.W.2d 699, 701 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). The three scenarios presented
represent the most common possibilities. Within those three, there are additional
variations.
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ted on in any way, other than approval for fairness and reasonable-
ness, or for conscionability.39 In this case, the agreement is presented
to the court only to identify it and to establish that it meets the sub-
stantive or procedural requirements imposed on such contracts by the
jurisdiction. 40 Many jurisdictions require an independent contract to
be presented to the court for some sort of review.4 ' The Supreme
Court of Connecticut has stated that provisions of an agreement not
presented to the court, and in fact concealed from the court, were con-
trary to public policy and therefore void.42 On the other hand, some
jurisdictions permit the parties to enter an independent contract dis-
posing of maintenance and property rights between them (exclusive of
issues relating to children), without any court involvement.43
The second possibility, which represents the middle ground and
generates perhaps the most incomprehensible body of law, arises
when the divorce settlement agreement is presented to the court, and
in some fashion is made a part of the divorce decree without com-
pletely merging into it. This creates some hybrid of contract and court
order.44 It raises complex questions of the ability to modify, the avail-
ability of remedies, and the nature of subsequent actions.
Finally, the third possibility occurs when the agreement is
presented to the court and is completely merged into the resulting di-
vorce decree, in which case the contract is extinguished and the rights
and obligations of the parties arise from the decree exclusively.45
39. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 687 S.W.2d 699, 701 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); In re Estate of
Hereford, 250 S.E.2d 45, 49 (W. Va. 1978); Sharp, supra note 1, at 1407-08.
40. See, eg., UMDA § 306(d), 9A U.L.A. 217 (1987); In re Marriage of Manzo, 659 P.2d
669, 674 (Colo. 1983); Johnston v. Johnston, 297 Md. 48, 56, 465 A.2d 436, 439
(1983). For a discussion of the substantive and procedural standards applied, see
Sharp, supra, note 1, at 1408 nn.35-37.
41. Sharp, supra note 1, at 1408. This requirement may be imposed statutorily, as by
UMDA § 306(b), (d), 9A U.L.A. 216-17 (1987), or by case law. Sharp, supra note 1,
at 1408. The standard imposed varies from state to state, and may require only
procedural fairness, or may go on to require substantive fairness. Id. For a fuller
discussion of this issue, see id. at 1408-58.
42. Baker v. Baker, 187 Conn. 315, 322, 445 A.2d 912, 915 (1982).
43. See, e.g., Spencer v. Spencer, 472 So. 2d 302, 306-07 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (parties
may contract regarding alimony independent of the decree in which cases the
decree will simply be silent as to alinony and the contract will be enforceable as
such); Walters v. Walters, 307 N.C. 381, 386, 298 S.E.2d, 338, 342 (1983)("The par-
ties can avoid the burdens of a court judgment by not submitting their agreement
to the court. By not coming to the court, the parties preserve their agreement as
a contract.").
44. Davis v. Davis, 687 S.W.2d 699, 701 (Mo. Ct. App 1985). See, e.g., Madnick v.
Madnick, 339 Pa. Super. 130, 132-33, 488 A.2d 344, 345-46 (1985); In re Estate of
Hereford, 250 S.E.2d 45, 49-50 (W. Va. 1978). The UMDA specifically provides for
a hybrid agreement decree in § 306(d), (e), (h). For a fuller discussion of the rele-
vant UMDA provisions, see infra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., East v. East, 395 So. 2d 78, 80 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981); Young v. Burkholder,
142 Ariz. 415, 418, 690 P.2d 134, 137 (Ct. App. 1984); Phillips v. Phillips, 93 Idaho
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A. Intention of the Parties
A number of courts faced with a question of whether a divorce set-
tlement agreement has been merged, incorporated, or stands in-
dependent of the decree entirely will look for the intent of the parties
and of the court that granted the decree.46 Intent may be found in
specific language within the agreement or decree, or may be inferred
from the totality of the circumstances.4 7 However, discerning the in-
tent of the parties to an agreement after the fact is at best an inexact
science. 48 In the context of divorce settlement agreements, the pres-
sure exerted by the conflicting policies underlying contract and do-
mestic relations law and the pressure of the frequently compelling
circumstances of actual cases further exacerbate the problem.49 Addi-
tionally, as with most contracts, any attempt to attribute intention to
the parties beyond the basic intention to be bound to the general pro-
visions of the agreement involves speculation about the parties'
thoughts concerning details and anticipated legal consequences that
the parties most likely never considered.5 0
384, 387, 462 P.2d 49, 52 (1969); Johnston v. Johnston, 297 Md. 48, 54-55, 465 A.2d
436, 438-39 (1983); Commonwealth ex rel. Tokach v. Tokach, 326 Pa. Super. 359,
362, 474 A.2d 41, 42-43 (1984); In re Estate of Hereford, 250 S.E.2d 45, 49 (W. Va.
1978). See H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 18.7, at 778.
46. See, e.g., East v. East, 395 So. 2d 78, 80 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981) (" 'the question
whether a separation agreement or a property settlement is merged in the decree
or survives as an independent agreement depends on the intention of the parties
and the court.' "); Jendrusch v. Jendrusch, 1 Haw. App. 605, 609, 623 P.2d 893, 896
(1981)(when language of agreement shows intent to make it part of the decree,
and the agreement is actually incorporated into the decree, provisions of agree-
ment are superseded and merged into the decree); Compton v. Compton, 101
Idaho 328, 332, 612 P.2d 1175, 1179 (1980)("Of course, merger, or its absence, is a
question of the parties' intent."); Johnston v. Johnston, 297 Md. 48, 56, 465 A.2d
436, 440 (1983)(language of agreement determines intention of parties with re-
spect to merger); McGough v. McGough, 361 Pa. Super 391, 394, 522 A.2d 638, 640
(1987)("In determining if the settlement agreement merged with the divorce de-
cree, we must establish whether or not a merger was intended by the parties.
This determination is made by analyzing the terms of the agreement itself.").
47. See, e.g., Jendrusch v. Jendrusch, 1 Haw. App. 605, 608, 623 P.2d 893, 896 (1981)(in-
tent determined by looking at language of parties); Johnston v Johnston, 297 Md.
48, 56, 465 A.2d 436, 440 (1983)(language of the agreement determines the inten-
tion of parties with respect to merger); McGough v. McGough, 361 Pa. Super 391,
394, 522 A.2d 638, 640 (1987)(question of merger determined by analyzing terms of
agreement); Nakashima v. Nakashima, 297 S.E.2d 208, 210 (W. Va. 1982)(in a close
case, the totality of circumstances determines the intent of the parties).
48. J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 20, at 30-32 (2d rev. ed. 1974).
49. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
50. Moseley v. Mosier, 279 S.C. 348, 352-53, 306 S.E.2d 624, 627 (1983)(parties gener-
ally use words of art without intending any particular legal consequences); In re
Estate of Hereford, 250 S.E.2d 45, 50 n.1 (W. Va. 1978)("What all these cases seem
to do is ignore the intentions of the parties, quite possibly because the parties did
not really intend anything-they merely used language the way everyone else
uses it, to-wit, carelessly."); J. MURRAY, supra note 48, § 20, at 32-33.
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1. Terms of Art
One distinction that the courts have made is to draw a line between
the use of the word "merged" and use of the words "incorporated" or
"incorporated by reference," the former indicating that the decree su-
persedes the agreement and the latter that the contract survives,
either independent of the decree entirely, or in some hybrid form.51
Under this approach, mere incorporation, without more, does not
render the agreement merged into the decree. Rather, it serves to
identify the agreement and render its validity res judicata in any sub-
sequent action.5 2 Were it as simple as using the magic words "incorpo-
ration" for one result, or "merger" for another, the practitioner could
simply insert the right word and be assured that the appropriate re-
sults would follow. However, it is not that simple or clear. For one
thing, judges, lawyers, and even legislators use the words carelessly
and inconsistently.5 3 For example, compare two Delaware cases, Solis
51. Murphy v. Murphy, 467 A.2d 129, 132 (Del. Faro. Ct. 1983)(an agreement that is
merely incorporated retains its contractual character and the court does not have
the power to modify the agreement unless the parties have contracturally given
that power, nor should a contempt citation issue in the first instance of breach,
whereas merger causes the rights and obligations of the parties under the agree-
ment to be displaced by the decree, under which those rights and obligations
would then be derived and enforced). See also Young v. Burkholder, 142 Ariz.
415,418, 690 P.2d 134,136 (Ct. App. 1984)("the word 'incorporation' is not synony-
mous with the word 'merger' and.., merger does not necessarily occur in every
instance in which incorporation of an agreement into the decree takes place").
Exactly what form the "hybrid" incorporated but not merged agreement will
take, and what impact that status will have on questions raised above, such as
enforcement remedies and modifiability, differs. For one approach, see Murphy
v. Murphy, 467 A.2d 129 132-33 (Del Farn. Ct. 1983). See also UMDA discussion
infra notes 157-58.
52. Young v. Young, 142 Ariz. 415, 418, 690 P.2d 134, 137 (Ct. App. 1984); Flynn v.
Flynn, 42 Cal. 2d 52, 58, 265 P.2d 865, 866 (1954); Murphy v. Murphy, 467 A.2d 129,
132 (Del. Fain. Ct. 1983).
53. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hereford, 250 S.E.2d 45, 50 n.1 (W. Va. 1978)(in discussing
West Virginia's "confusing" line of cases on incorporation and merger, Justice
Neely observed that "parties merely used language the way everyone else uses it,
to-wit, carelessly").
A recently amended Massachusetts statute provides a striking example of a
legislature's loose use of the terms of art. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 1A
(West Supp. 1985)(amended 1985)(that allowed for obtaining a consensual divorce
by filing of an agreement) formerly provided:
If the finding is in the affirmative, the court shall approve the agreement
and it shall have the full force and effect of an order of the court and
shall be incorporated and merged into said order, and by the agreement
of the parties it may also remain as an independent contract.
Id. (emphasis added). A court faced with interpreting application of that provi-
sion had to discern the legislators' meaning and concluded that:
[Tihe Legislature, in enacting G.L. c.208, § 1A [Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 208,
§ 1A] did not intend to use the term "merged" in its technical sense [as]
is clearly demonstrated by the phrase which follows that term in the
statute. If a separation agreement approved by the court and incorpo-
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v. Tea5 4 and Murphy v. Murphy.55 In Solis, the Delaware Supreme
Court analyzed the applicability of a statutory provision allowing mod-
ification of divorce decrees and court orders and concluded it was ap-
plicable to "separation agreements merged" with judicial decrees, but
not to "unincorporated separation contracts."5 6 In Murphy, the Dela-
ware Family Court, discussing the applicability of the same statutory
provision, contrasted the opposite results which would occur if the
agreement was "merely incorporated into the divorce decree [no modi-
fication] or merged therein [modification permitted]."57
While these two cases do not show a necessarily irreconcilable use
of the words, they do show, at best, a lack of clarity, and at worst,
inconsistency. The usage in Solis implies that there exist two pos-
sibilities: "merged" or its opposite, "unincorporated." Incorporated or
incorporated by reference would appear to fall somewhere in the un-
identified-in-between. The usage in Murphy implies that the possibili-
ties are "merged" or "incorporated" with unincorporated falling into
an unidentified category. The point is not whether cases can be recon-
ciled, for surely they can. Rather, the contrast demonstrates that the
meanings associated with these "terms of art" or "magic words"5 8
have become blurred through years of imprecise use. Further, just
which terms are the current words of choice, and whether they will be
consistently interpreted in the future, also cannot be determined with
certainty.
2. Discerning Actual Intent
Perhaps because of this, most appellate courts do not draw bright
lines on the basis of words of art alone, but rather look further to de-
termine what the parties and the trial court intended to accomplish.59
rated into an order for judgment were truly to be merged into that order,
the separation agreement could not 'by agreement of the parties ... also
remain as an independent contract.'
Stansel v. Stansel, 385 Mass. 510, 513, 432 N.E.2d 691, 694 (1982). Subsequently,
the legislature amended the statute and eliminated the inconsistency. MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 1A (West 1987).
54. 468 A.2d 1276 (Del. 1983).
55. 467 A.2d 129 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1983).
56. Solis v. Tea, 468 A.2d 1276, 1280 (Del. 1983).
57. Murphy v. Murphy, 467 A.2d 129, 132-33 (Del. Fan. Ct. 1983).
58. See Moseley v. Mosier, 279 S.C. 348, 352-53, 306 S.E.2d 624, 627 (1983); In re Estate
of Hereford, 250 S.E.2d 45, 52 (W. Va. 1978).
59. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Tokach v. Tokach, 326 Pa. Super. 359, 361-62, 474
A.2d 41, 42 (1984)("Although some jurisdictions recognize a distinction between
incorporation of a settlement agreement and merger of an agreement into a di-
vorce decree, no such distinction has ever been held by a Pennsylvania appellate
court to affect the power of the trial court to modify the amount of child sup-
port."); Moseley v. Mosier, 279 S.C. 348, 352-53, 306 S.E.2d 624, 626-27 (1983)(par-
ties' intent rarely revealed from agreement's words of art); In re Estate of
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As Justice Neely explained in In re Estate of Hereford, reliance by the
courts on "magic" words of art to determine, after the fact, what the
parties intended in their agreement too frequently results in the crea-
tion of "outrageous traps for the unwary."6 0 In Hereford, the court
refused to make, automatically, a distinction based on use of the words
"ratified" and "confirmed" on the one hand,61 and "merged" or
"adopted"6 2 on the other.6 3
Though laudable, efforts to individualize interpretation of settle-
ment agreements and to infer from provisions and circumstances the
intent of the parties on a case-by-case basis undermine certainty and
predictability, a result identified most eloquently by Justice Neely in
Hereford.64 The Pennsylvania courts' experience illustrates this.65
In Brown v. Hall,66 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court distinguished
between support agreements that continue beyond entry of a divorce
decree as contractual obligations, and those that merge into the subse-
quent divorce decree.6 7 The distinction turned on the parties' intent,
which the court held was a question of fact.68 In Brown, the parties
"expressly provided in their separation agreement that they wished 'to
enter into a financial agreement which will survive any divorce which
may occur.' "69 Such a specific expression of intent made the determi-
nation in Brown relatively easy.
Two years later, in Millstein v. Millstein,70 the superior court con-
sidered whether an agreement was merged or not and concluded that
Hereford, 250 S.E.2d 45, 52 (W. Va. 1978)(words of art serve as traps for the
unwary).
60. 250 S.E.2d 45, 52 (W. Va. 1978).
61. Id. at 51. Presumably "ratified" or "confirmed" were used to represent the case
in which the decree did not supersede the agreement.
62. Id. Presumably "merged" and "adopted" were used to represent the case in
which the subsequent decree superseded the agreement.
63. Id. The rule set forth in Hereford was announced by the court as prospectively
applicable. It applied a presumption of merger absent clear provision to the con-
trary by the parties in the agreement. Id. at 51-52. This presumption approach
will be discussed more fully below. See infra notes 100-35 and accompanying
text.
64. In re Estate of Hereford, 250 S.E.2d 45, 51-52 (W. Va. 1978). See supra notes 50 &
53.
65. Referring to the Pennsylvania appellate decisions on the question of property
settlement and separation agreements, which he, as a family court judge, was
frequently required to interpret, Judge Strassburger of the Allegheny County
Court of Common Pleas noted: "Regrettably, these decisions have produced more
confusion than clarity in this difficult area." Kravetz v. Kravetz, 135 Pitt. L.J. 16,
20 n.4 (quoting Ashton, CZarifI Support-Agreement Law, Pitt. L.J. Rptr. (Dec. 17,
1984)).
66. 495 Pa. 635, 435 A.2d 859 (1981).
67. Id. at 639-41, 435 A.2d at 861-62.
68. Id. at 640 n.6, 435 A.2d at 861 n.6.
69. Id. n.7.
70. 311 Pa. Super. 495, 457 A.2d 1291 (1983).
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the parties did not intend their agreement to merge into the decree.
The court quoted the parties' language and concluded that the child
support obligation in question was "a 'separate and undisputed cove-
nant'.. . that [was to] 'remain in full force and effect regardless of any
change in the marital status of the parties.' "71 While not as clear a
provision as the one in Brown, the agreement language in Millstein
was reasonably easy to interpret.
Then, in 1984, the superior court decided Commonwealth ex rel
Tokach v. Tokach,72 also a case involving a provision for child support,
which, rather than clarifying the developing law, confused it by
broadly stating that Pennsylvania appellate courts did not recognize
the difference between incorporation and merger. The court held:
"[O]nce a settlement agreement is incorporated into a divorce decree,
either by reference or set out in full, the settlement agreement merges
into the decree and should no longer be given independent effect." 73
Although Tokach dealt specifically with child support, and, there-
fore, can be interpreted as applying only to that special situation 74
(and perhaps only to an attempt at reduction), the court's broad state-
ment appears to encompass all agreements.
Trial courts and subsequent panels of the superior court almost im-
mediately began distinguishing and narrowing Tokach.75 In Madnick
v. Madnick,76 the superior court observed that if incorporation auto-
matically results in merger, then "the Tokach exception [would] swal-
low the Millstein rule"; a result the panel in Madnick found neither
appropriate nor necessary.7 7 Therefore, in Madnick, the superior
court again invoked the rule that whether merger occurs depends on
the parties' intent, to be discerned from the terms of the agreement. 78
The panel then found that the parties in Madnick intended to create a
contractual obligation, independent of the obligation included in the
71. Id. at 497, 457 A.2d at 1292. Complicating Millstein, and in fact the entire line of
cases, are the special considerations that apply to child support obligations. See
supra note 28 and accompanying text.
72. 326 Pa. Super. 359, 474 A.2d 41 (1984). Again complicating the analysis, Tokach
dealt specifically with child support.
73. Id. at 362, 474 A.2d at 42. Many practitioners had relied on the distinction be-
tween incorporation and merger in drafting divorce settlement agreements. As-
ton, Clarify Support-Agreement Law, Pitt. L.J. Rptr. (Dec. 17, 1984).
74. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., McGough v. McGough, 361 Pa. Super. 391, 522 A.2d 638 (1987); Lee v.
Lee, 352 Pa. Super. 241, 507 A.2d 862 (1986); Madnick v. Madnick, 339 Pa. Super.
130, 488 A.2d 344 (1985); Stanley v. Stanley, 339 Pa. Super. 118, 488 A.2d 338
(1985); Van Kirk v. Van Kirk, 336 Pa. Super. 502, 485 A.2d 1194 (1984); Shilling v.
Shilling, 20 Crawford County L.J. 4 (Pa. C.P. 1986); Price v. Price, 33 Chester
County Rep. 123 (Pa. C.P. 1985); Kravetz v. Kravetz, 135 Pitt. L.J. 16 (Allegheny
County, Pa. C.P. 1986).
76. 339 Pa. Super. 130, 488 A.2d 344 (1985).
77. Id. at 132-33 n.1, 488 A.2d at 345-46 n.1.
78. Id. at 132-33, 488 A.2d at 345.
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court order, based on the fact that the parties provided in one para-
graph that the husband agreed to pay the specified amount of child
support, and in the next paragraph, that he agreed to sign a stipulation
entering the amount as a court order. The court reasoned that the
purpose for requiring that the contractual obligation be entered as a
court order was "plainly not to extinguish the contractual obligation
as fast as it has been created, but to provide an alternative ehforce-
ment method."79 Further, the court observed, the agreement pur-
ported to settle all claims between the parties, and such final
settlement only could be accomplished if the agreement to pay sur-
vived as a contractual obligation, since court ordered support would
always be modifiable.8 0 While this is certainly a reasonable interpre-
tation of the parties' intention, use of the word "plainly" probably goes
too far. Other interpretations are certainly defensible and might be
anticipated after Tokach.
In Hollman v. Hollman,S1 the superior court further clouded mat-
ters with a lengthy discourse, not critical to the issues before it or to its
holding, on the nature of support agreements in Pennsylvania. The
court faced a question of remedies available to enforce spousal sup-
port, a question that turned on the status of the agreement. The court
cited Tokach, and explained that incorporated agreements are enforce-
able as orders of the court, are reviewable and modifiable, and that
unincorporated agreements are enforceable as contracts in assumpsit
actions.8 2 This implies an either/or situation, and does not seem to
take into account Madnick's discounting of the idea that incorporation
need not result in automatic merger.8 3
In Lee v. Lee,84 the superior court again considered the issue in the
context of spousal support. While recognizing the Madnick holding,
the superior court made a fine distinction. The court found that, when
the parties provided in their agreement only that the court could enter
an order for the agreed amount of spousal maintenance, the parties
did not intend to create a contractual obligation for the payment of
support that was separate from the court order, but rather they in-
tended for the agreement to merge into the decree.85 The distinction
79. Id. at 133-34, 488 A.2d at 346.
80. Id. Because court ordered child support always may be modified by the court, the
only final way to settle the claim would be through a contract provision, which
arguably is not modifiable. However, even a contractual provision will not pre-
vent a Pennsylvania court from increasing child support (although it might pre-
vent the court from decreasing such an award), and such an increase may not
entitle the obligor to a breach of contract action. See MilIstein v. Millstein, 311
Pa. Super. 495, 501-02, 457 A.2d 1291, 1294 (1983).
81. 347 Pa. Super. 289, 500 A.2d 837 (1985).
82. Id. at 300-04, 500 A.2d at 842-45.
83. See supra notes 76.80 and accompanying text.
84. 352 Pa. Super. 241, 507 A-2d 862 (1986).
85. Id. at 245, 507 A.2d at 864.
1988]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
that appears to have convinced the court was the fact that the agree-
ment in Lee did not separate a provision for the obligation to pay from
a provision for entry of an order, but rather specified only the hus-
band's agreement to entry of an order for spousal support in the
amount of $150 per month.86 The result is, perhaps, reasonable, but
the fine distinctions relied on by the court might well be lost on the
contracting parties.
Next came Casper v. Casper,8 7 which involved an attempt to mod-
ify spousal support payments being made pursuant to an agreement
entered prior to enactment of the new divorce code and, thus, at a time
when court ordered spousal support was unavailable. The agreement
was "adopted and entered as an Order of the Court."8 8 The panel rec-
ognized the distinction between "'court ordered support' and orders
which include the terms of a... support agreement,"8 9 and concluded
that the distinction turned on the parties' intent.9 0 In a footnote, the
panel held Tokach strictly to its facts, noting that the case dealt with
"modification of a child support agreement, an issue which encom-
passes very different policy consideration." 91 The court concluded
that the parties intended to create an independent contractual obliga-
tion which was, therefore, not modifiable, but which, by virtue of its
entry as a court order, gained for the parties the equitable remedies of
the court (contempt, wage attachment, execution).92 Thus, the court
approved the middle or hybrid category of agreement/order.
Finally, in McGough v. McGough,93 another case involving an at-
tempt to decrease child support payments, the superior court returned
to the question of incorporation, merger, and the status of support
agreements. The court again distinguished Tokach, finding its "no-dif-
ference-between-incorporation-and-merger" statement did not apply
where the agreement and the court order contained an explicit non-
merger provision.94 Referring to Millstein, however, the court noted
86. Id.
87. 359 Pa. Super. 559, 519 A.2d 493 (1986).
88. Id. at 560, 519 A.2d at 494. Prior to the new Divorce Code, Pennsylvania law did
not provide for post-divorce spousal support. The only way parties could provide
for post divorce spousal support was through an agreement. Id. Such agreements,
however, still raised the questions of merger and incorporation, ability to modify,
and available remedies. See id. at 562-64, 519 A.2d at 495-97.
89. Id. at 562, 519 A.2d at 495.
90. Id. (citing Bell v. Bell, 228 Pa. Super. 280, 323 A.2d 267 (1974)(involving pre-di-
vorce spousal support, not post-divorce support)).
91. Id. at 565 n.6, 519 A.2d at 496 n.6.
92. Id. at 565, 519 A.2d at 496.
93. 361 Pa. Super. 391, 522 A.2d 638 (1987).
94. Id. at 394, 522 A.2d at 640. The divorce decree stated that the "agreement was
incorporated into the decree," but later specified that the agreement "'shall not




that regardless of the understanding of the parties "as to modifiability,
a court is not precluded by the terms of the property settlement agree-
ment from increasing the amount of child support."95
Pennsylvania Common Pleas Court judges faced with questions of
merger and incorporation candidly admit confusion: "Recent deci-
sions have only added to the morass created by... Brown ... -Mill-
stein ... ,and Tokach .. .."96 "Unfortunately, it is possible for counsel
to cite a superior court case in support of both of the positions they
wish to take.... [W]e will attempt to trace the various pronounce-
ments of our appellate courts in as logical a fashion as we can."97 "We
have little doubt that the confused and sometimes contradictory teach-
ings of such recent appellate cases as Brown .... Millstein ... ,and
Tokach ..., among others, have led counsel to cast this matter in the
unusual procedural posture that it now occupies."9 8
The judges' confusion can only reflect similar confusion on the part
of practitioners struggling to decipher from these opinions exactly
what provision must be made, what language must be included, and
what steps must be taken to achieve the results their clients desire.
This line of cases in Pennsylvania is certainly not unique to that Com-
monwealth, but rather is representative of the problems involved in
developing a principled, predictable approach based on discerning the
intent of the parties and the court. Pennsylvania has attempted to
clarify the situation with amendments to its divorce code specifically
addressing the status of agreements. 99 However, the amendments
95. Id. at 393 n.1, 522 A.2d at 639 n.1 (emphasis added). One might conclude then,
that provisions in an agreement for child support wil always be subject to in-
crease, regardless of whether the agreement survives and retains contractual
characteristics. However, survival of the contract may bar modification down.
Questions remain, however, regarding the availability of contract damages in a
case where child support is increased in the face of a surviving agreement.
96. Kravetz v. Kravetz, 135 Pitt. L.J. 16,20 n.4 (Allegheney County, Pa. C.P. 1986)(ci-
tations omitted).
97. Shilling v. Shilling, 20 Crawford County L.J. 4, 4-5 (Pa. C.P. 1986).
98. Price v. Price, 33 Chester County Rep. 123,125 (Pa. C.P. 1986) (citations omitted).
99. In 1988, Pennsylvania amended its divorce code to provide specifically for the
status of divorce settlement agreements. In one section, the statute makes avail-
able a variety of remedies, including entry of judgment, attachment, garnish-
ment, and a finding of contempt, when a party has failed to comply with an order
of equitable distribution, or with the terms of an agreement entered after a hear-
ing. 1988 Pa. Leg. Serv. 13, sec. 1, § 401(k) (Purdon). In a later section, the stat-
ute provides that
[a] party to an agreement regarding matters within the jurisdiction of
the court under this act, whether or not the agreement has been merged
or incorporated into the decree, may utilize a remedy or sanction set
forth in this act to enforce the agreement to the same extent as though
the agreement had been an order of the court except as provided to the
contrary in the agreement.
Id. sec. 2, § 401.1(a). The statute specifies that child support always will be modi-
fiable upon a showing of changed circumstances, but that in the absence of a spe-
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may raise as many questions as they answer.
B. Application of a Presumption
As noted above, the law in West Virginia developed in much the
same incomprehensible way as it had in Pennsylvania. 00 To solve the
problem, or in Justice Neely's words "[i]n order to disengage ourselves
from the mire,"10 1 the West Virginia court, in Hereford, announced a
new rule employing a presumption which was designed to establish a
sure, predictable approach to interpretation of parties' agreements.
The court held that parties could agree to virtually anything they
wished, as long as the court approved. By way of example, the court
explained that the parties could contract out of continuing judicial su-
pervision, could contract for judicial enforcement (i.e., contempt and
garnishment), and could contract for nonmodification of spousal main-
tenance. As long as the court determines that the terms are fair and
reasonable, it may approve them, ratify them, or merge them, and by
whatever words the court uses, the terms would become part of the
decree and binding on everyone including the court.
However, in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary in a property
settlement agreement appended to, made part of, or incorporated by reference
into the court order, which provision specifically and unambiguously denies
the court jurisdiction in one or more of the regards just discussed, it shall be
presumed that regardless of the language used, whether it be "ratified and
confirmed," "merged," or any other language of the like import, that a peri-
odic payment to which reference is made in a divorce decree is judicially de-
creed... and is subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the circuit court. 1 0 2
cific provision to the contrary, a provision regarding, among other things,
property rights and alimony is not modifiable by the court. Id. § 401.1 (b), (c).
While a welcome attempt to untangle the Gordian knot created by the case law
that had evolved, the statute leaves much to be desired in terms of clarity. For
example, § 401.1(a) permits the listed remedies to enforce an agreement
"whether or not it has been merged or incorporated." One wonders whether this
contemplates a wholly independent agreement which is not brought to the atten-
tion of the court at all. See Tupra notes 39-43 and accompanying text. As sug-
gested in the conclusion of this article, some review of contracts is probably
desirable. See infra notes 304-10 and accompanying text. Further, the language
of § 401(k), when referring to a court order, clearly specifies that the remedies
are available to enforce an order of equitable distribution. 1988 Pa. Leg. Serv. 13,
sec. 1, § 401(k) (Purdon). However, when dealing in that same sentence with
agreements, the statute more broadly refers to "an agreement as entered between
the parties, after hearing." Id. This raises the question of whether the specified
remedies are available for any agreement or only for one dealing with equitable
distribution. Further confusing the issue, or perhaps rendering this question ir-
relevant, is § 401.1 which apparently gives all agreements relating to divorce set-
tlement judgment remedies, which would presumably include those listed in
§ 401(k).
100. In re Estate of Hereford, 250 S.E.2d 45, 49-51 (W. Va. 1978); see supra notes 60-64
and accompanying text.
101. Id. at 51.
102. Id. at 51-52.
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Thus, in Hereford, the West Virginia Supreme Court set out a
clear rule, to be applied prospectively, by which parties could specifi-
cally describe the exact result they wished. If approved by the court,
the parties could then count on these expressed intentions being
honored in the face of later litigation.
Justice Neely's dream of "inaugurating a new system" which
would achieve certainty and predictability of contracting in this area
was, however, short lived. The Hereford holding was announced to
take effect for all agreements entered after February 1, 1979.103 In
October 1979, the Nakashimas entered a divorce settlement agreement
that provided, among other things, for the husband to pay spousal
maintenance to the wife "for a period of six years, at which time Wife
agrees that alimony shall cease and she shall thereafter be entitled to
no further payments."1 0 4 The divorce decree entered pursuant to that
agreement varied from it in that the agreement provided for spousal
maintenance for six years, after which time the wife would be entitled
to no more payments, while the decree provided for the agreed-to
spousal maintenance with no termination date, and stated that pay-
ments should continue until "further order of this Court."105 Further
confusing matters, the divorce court stated that it found the parties'
agreement to be fair and reasonable, and that the agreement was rati-
fied and confirmed by the court.10 6
In 1980, the husband sought and obtained judicial modification of
the alimony provision based on a showing of changed circumstances.
Thus, the stage was set for consideration of the question of merger,
because, if the agreement had merged into the decree, it would be
103. Id. at 51.
104. Nakashima v. Nakashima, 297 S.E.2d 208,209 (W. Va. 1982). The court set out the
entire paragraph which it identified as the one in issue as follows:
Husband shall pay to Wife as alimony the sum of $200.00 per month to
begin on September 5,1979, and be due on the 5 [sic] day of each month
thereafter, for a period of six years, at which time Wife agrees that ali-
mony shall cease and she shall thereafter be entitled to no further pay-
ments in the form of alimony. Further, it is agreed between the parties
that the alimony will cease upon any remarriage of Jeannine D.
Nakashima.
Id.
105. The court order read as follows:
It is further ORDERED that the Plaintiff shall pay to the defendant
as alimony the sum of $200.00 per month, to begin on September 1, 1979,
and be due on the 1st day of each month thereafter payable through the
Circuit Clerk's office until further order of this Court.
It further appearing to the Court that the parties hereto have entered
into a Property Settlement Agreement dated the 27th day of July, 1979,
which agreement appears to be fair and reasonable, it is further OR-






modifiable, but if it had not, it could not be modified by the court with-
out the consent of both parties.
In an opinion by Justice Neely, who authored Hereford, the court
in Nakashima found that the case was a close one "because the lan-
guage and tenor of the property settlement agreement are entirely at
odds with the language of the circuit court's order."'1o 7 Thus, the court
concluded that it must determine the intent of the parties and the di-
vorce court from analyzing the totality of the circumstances. The
court found the intent of the divorcing parties to be obvious: that the
amount of alimony would be predictable (nonmodifiable and termina-
ble as contracted).108 As for the divorce court's intention, since it did
expressly approve of the agreement despite its inclusion of contradic-
tory language and since Hereford indicated that West Virginia favored
enforcing fair agreements between divorcing parties, the court found
that the divorce court intended to give its approval to the entire con-
tract as entered by the parties and, therefore, held that the alimony
provision was not modifiable.109
Nakashima does not carry forward the spirit of reform heralded in
Hereford. In Hereford, the court announced as close to a bright line
rule as one could expect in this area, namely, that in the absence of an
express provision in the agreement to the contrary, which provision
specifically and unambiguously denies the court jurisdiction to modify
alimony, it shall be presumed that "a periodic payment to which refer-
ence is made in a divorce decree is judicially decreed alimony... and
is subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the circuit court."110 While
it is reasonable to conclude, as the court did, that the divorce court in
Nakashima in fact meant to approve the provisions contained in the
parties' agreement, it is difficult to find the language which "specifi-
cally and unambiguously denies the court jurisdiction" over the ali-
mony provision."'l The quoted paragraph unambiguously expressed
the agreement of the husband to pay alimony for six years, and the
wife's agreement to accept that and no more. However, as to denying
the court jurisdiction to modify the alimony provisions upon a proper
showing of unanticipated changed circumstances, one can only infer
that as a possible intention of the parties. But, as the court points out,
it is a close case, and a close case without the specific, unambiguous
language the Hereford rule required. Thus, the presumption an-
nounced should control, and the payments should have been subject to
judicial modification.
While the result in Nakashima is probably equitable and even may
107. Id. at 210.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. In re Estate of Hereford, 250 S.E.2d 45, 52 (W. Va. 1978).
111. Nakashmia v. Nakashima, 297 S.E.2d 208, 210 (W. Va. 1982).
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be an accurate interpretation of the parties'n 2 and the court's113 inten-
tions, it is at odds with the Hereford holding, and unnecessarily blurs
the rule announced in Hereford. Thus, it undercuts the predictability
that the rule could have brought to divorce settlement agreements in
West Virginia.
Although perhaps the most forthright in identifying the problem
and proposing a solution, West Virginia is not alone in its approach.
Other jurisdictions have attempted to formulate a rule that would
clarify the situation. For example, Idaho, as early as 1969, recognized
the problems created by an ad hoc, after-the-fact analysis of parties'
intentions and in Phillips v. Phillips1 4 rejected this approach.
According to the Idaho Supreme Court:
Cases have held that actual incorporation of the terms of the agreement into a
divorce decree or physical attachment of the agreement to the decree will usu-
ally, but not always, indicate the intent to merge the agreement into the de-
cree. . . . Other cases have held that "approval," "ratification," or
"confirmation" of the agreement by the court is not sufficient to denote
merger. 1
1 5
The court then went on to suggest that these distinctions amounted
only to distinctions without real differences and presented no rational
basis upon which lawyers and laypersons might guide their actions.11 6
Thus, in Phillips, the Idaho Supreme Court abandoned attempts to
decipher the unarticulated intentions of the parties and divorce courts,
and adopted a presumption approach." 7
The Idaho court held that in the absence of clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary, when parties presented a divorce settlement
agreement to a court and requested the court to approve, ratify, or
confirm the agreement, a presumption would arise that the agreement
merged into the decree, would be enforceable as part of the decree,
and would be modifiable by the court if necessary in the future. 8 On
the facts of Phillips, the court found no clear intention relating to
merger. Therefore, it applied the presumption and held that the di-
112. It is also possible the parties did not intend to divest the court of its continuing
jurisdiction over spousal maintenance, as the court itself indicated, calling this a
close case. See id.
113. The appellate court in Nakashima suggested that the disparity between the de-
cree rendered by the divorce court providing for alimony until "further order of
this court" and the parties' agreement on the six-year period was simply a clerical
error on the part of the divorce court. Id. at 211. This is an entirely plausible
explanation, and answers the question of whether the divorce court in fact ap-
proved the agreement as submitted to it. It does not, however, address the issue
of Herefordb requirement of a specific provision by the parties in their agree-
ments as necessary to avoid the presumption of continuing jurisdiction to modify.
114. Phillips v. Phillips, 93 Idaho 384, 386, 462 P.2d 49, 51-52 (1969).






vorce court had continuing jurisdiction to modify an alimony
provision. 119
Subsequent courts applied the Phillips rule.120 Then, in Compton
v. Compton,12 1 the court applied, and put a gloss on, the rule. After
Phillips, the Compton court explained: "[I]n close cases a presump-
tion will be indulged in favor of a finding of merger.... [I]f there are
cross references between the property settlement agreement and the
divorce decree, a merger will be presumed unless the parties make it
clear that the reference and inclusion is for some other purpose."'12 2
However, this clear rule was confused by the Idaho Supreme
Court's decision in Sullivan v. Sullivan. 23 In Sullivan, the parties
entered a divorce settlement agreement which provided for alimony,
among other things. According to the supreme court's summary of
the facts, the agreement provided "that it would be submitted to the
court for approval, but not merged as a part of the judgment.'"124 The
order entered by the divorce court provided that the agreement was
" 'ratified, confirmed and approved, but [was] not merged herein,'"
and "specifically ordered the defendant to make alimony pay-
ments."125 On these facts, the majority in Sullivan concluded that the
alimony provision was modifiable by the court, although it ultimately
concluded sufficient changed circumstances had not been proven to
justify modification.126 The problem, of course, as pointedly noted by
Justice Shepard,127 was that the majority ignored the fact that the par-
ties' agreement specified it was not to be merged, and that the divorce
court entered an order stating that the agreement was not so
119. Id.
120. Phillips v. District Court, 95 Idaho 404, 405, 509 P.2d 1325, 1326 (1973).
121. 101 Idaho 328, 612 P.2d 1175 (1980).
122. Id. at 333, 612 P.2d at 1180. It should be noted that the court found the language of
the divorce court's order and the agreement "perhaps sufficiently clear" to per-
mit it to hold that the parties intended merger, even without application of the
Phillips presumption. The agreement provided that it "shall be introduced in
evidence in the trial of said divorce action, and subject to the approval of the
court, shall be ratified and confirmed in the decree of divorce." The ensuing de-
cree stated "[t]hat all of the terms, provisions and conditions of that certain prop-
erty settlement and the child custody agreement . . . are hereby ratified,
confirmed, approved and made part of this judgment and decree of divorce as if
set out here in full." Id. at 332-33, 612 P.2d at 1180. While the language of the
court order might be so interpreted, the language of the agreement is much less
clear, and without the Phillips presumption and the gloss added by the court in
this case an analysis of intent could go either way.
123. 102 Idaho 737, 639 P.2d 435 (1981).
124. Id. at 738, 639 P.2d at 436 (emphasis added).
125. Id. at 739 n.6, 639 P.2d at 437 n.6 (emphasis in original deleted).
126. Id. at 740, 639 P.2d at 438.
127. Id. at 741, 639 P.2d at 439 (Shepard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).




merged. 2 s The majority did not deal with this problem in the body of
the opinion but addressed Justice Shepard's criticism in a confusing
footnote. The best explanation offered was that neither party had
raised the question of the court's ability to modify, and in fact, "both
parties proceeded on the basis that the alimony award was subject to
modification."12 9
The majority opinion, without citing Phillips, acknowledged the
general rule that it could not modify a property settlement agreement
merely ratified or approved but not merged. However, it found that
this general rule did not apply because, in addition to approving the
agreement, "the trial court specifically ordered the defendant to make
alimony payments. Thus the court had continuing jurisdiction... to
modify the award."130 The majority suggested that even in the face of
an explicit non-merger clause in a divorce settlement agreement, a
clause which the divorce court apparently approved and included ex-
pressly in its order, merger was inferred through application of an old
rule providing that merger is accomplished by the court's ordering the
parties to do what they have agreed to do in their contract.131
Concurring specially, Justice McFadden explained that when the
trial court ordered the alimony payments "it disregarded the non-
merger provisions of the agreement" regarding alimony. The solution,
suggested Justice McFadden, was for one of the parties to appeal that
portion of the decree. Neither party having appealed, the merger was
res judicata, argued Justice McFadden.132
In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Shepard con-
cluded unhesitatingly that no merger was intended by either of the
parties, or by the court. This was obvious, he argued, from the circum-
stances and the explicit provisions of the agreement, the most impor-
tant one being the provision that said that while the agreement would
be submitted to the court for approval, it was not to be merged as part
of the judgment. The divorce court's order explicitly held that the
agreement was not merged, argued Justice Shepard, when it recited
128. Id. at 743, 639 P.2d at 441.
129. Id. at 739 n.6, 639 P.2d at 437 n.6. It should be noted that this explanation was
offered with respect to the question of whether or not the agreement was "inte-
grated"-that is, whether or not the property and support provisions were so in-
terdependent as to limit the court's authority to modify alimony regardless of
merger. Many courts apply the rule that when an agreement covers both support
and property arrangements, and when it appears that these provisions are mutu-
ally dependent and negotiated one in consideration for the other, modification is
inappropriate, despite incorporation or merger, since to modify the support as-
pects would effectively modify the property aspects. See, e.g., White v. White, 296
N.C. 661, 666, 252 S.E.2d 698, 701 (1979).
130. Sullivan v. Sullivan, 102 Idaho 737, 739 n.6, 639 P.2d 435, 437 n.6 (1981).
131. Id. (citing Roesbery v. Roesbery, 88 Idaho 514, 401 P.2d 805 (1965)(holding no
merger where court does not order parties to do that to which they have agreed)).
132. Id. at 740, 639 P.2d at 439 (McFadden, J., concurring specially).
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that the parties' agreement was "'hereby ratified, confirmed and ap-
proved, but is not merged herein.' "133 This, he concluded, totally re-
butted the argument that the decree should have been appealed. "It
would have been absurd for Sullivan to appeal."' 3 4
As in Nakashima, it does not appear that the decision in Sullivan
caused a travesty of justice as far as the parties were concerned. How-
ever, the reasoning implicit in the majority opinion cannot be recon-
ciled with Phillips and Compton. The most satisfactory explanation is
that the question of the court's ability to modify simply was not raised
by the parties and, therefore, was not before the court.135 However,
the majority's willingness to ignore the express agreement of the par-
ties, as well as the apparent approval by the divorce court of all aspects
-including non-merger-of the parties' agreement, and to rely in-
stead on inferences drawn from language in the court order not explic-
itly addressing the issue of merger, unnecessarily resurrects the
chaotic approach put to rest in Idaho by Phillips.
C. Stipulation or Independent Contract
In considering the status of divorce settlement agreements, Arkan-
sas makes a distinction different than that made by most courts. The
decisions recognize two different types of agreements. 36 One, labeled
an independent contract, although approved by the court and incorpo-
rated in the decree, does not merge.'3 7 It retains its contractual char-
acter, and thus is not modifiable by the court, although it does carry, in
addition to contract remedies, 3 8 the contempt remedy.139 The other
133. Id. at 743, 639 P.2d at 441 (Shepard, J., concurring and dissenting).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 739 n.6, 639 P.2d at 437 n.6. See supra text accompanying note 129.
136. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 248 Ark. 835, 838, 454 S.W.2d 660, 662 (1970).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 837-38, 454 S.W.2d at 662.
139. Id. Allowing contempt as a remedy where payments of spousal support are not
modifiable raises the possibility of harsh results. "[lnitially fair agreements may
be rendered manifestly oppressive" by unforeseeable changed circumstances that
may develop over the long term over which many of these agreements will run.
McClain v. McClain, 15 Ohio St. 3d 289, 291, 473 N.E.2d 811, 814 (1984)(Ford, J.,
dissenting). See also In re Marriage of Neilson, 100 Cal. App. 3d 874, 877-78, 161
Cal. Rptr. 272, 275 (1980). Softening the harshness, however, is the general rule
that an obligor only can be found in contempt of court for failure to pay support
if the obligor willfully fails to pay. See, e.g., Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 68, 72-73
(1948) (defendant must be able to perform what the court has ordered for impris-
onment for civil contempt to lie) (consideration in context of bankruptcy proceed-
ing where defendant failed to comply with court's turnover order); Sword v.
Sword, 59 Mich. App. 730, 734, 229 N.W.2d 907, 908 (1975)(defendant must be
shown able to comply to be found willfully in contempt), aff'd, 399 Mich. 367, 249
N.W.2d 88 (1976); Barrett v. Barrett, 470 Pa. 253, 261-64, 368 A.2d 616, 619-621
(1977)(following discussion of civil as opposed to criminal contempt court con-
cludes that noncompliance must be willful); H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 16.6, at 675.
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results when the parties, without making a contract that is intended to
confer upon them independent contractual rights and obligations,
merely present to the court a stipulated agreement as a means of dis-
pensing with proof on the appropriate amount of support.140
Distinguishing between "mere stipulations" and "independent con-
tracts" may cause more difficulty than these explanations suggest. In
Armstrong v Armstrong, the court considered and found persuasive
the comprehensiveness of the agreement 4 1 and the fact that provi-
sions were included which the court would not have had the power to
award on its own, absent the agreement, and concluded the parties
intended an independent contract.1 42
Attesting to the difficulty in making such decisions with any cer-
tainty, the dissenting opinion in Armstrong, though agreeing with the
majority on the applicable law, reached the exact opposite conclu-
sion.143 The dissent noted that the language of the decree, along with
the fact that suit was filed and tried less than a month after the agree-
ment was entered, and that the agreement itself was captioned as it
would have been if it were a pleading filed or a decree issued, indi-
cated that a stipulation, not an independent agreement was intended.
The dissent found "the conclusion that the agreement was merged
into the decree inescapable."144 The dissenting justice had criticized
the Arkansas approach in the past, calling it "judicial hairsplitting"
and decrying the confusion generated by characterizing seemingly like
agreements differently.145 Intermediate courts were left to further
develop and interpret the rules. In Sterling v. Sterling,146 the Arkan-
Thus, inability to pay brought on by changed circumstances would be a defense to
a possible jail term. However, it would not help the party who, though able to
pay, would, because of changed circumstances, find payment extraordinarily bur-
densome.
Further, at least under Arkansas law, the rule need not be as harsh as it ap-
pears since the court is not required to impose contempt for violation of its de-
cree, and may consider the circumstances in exercising its discretion to do so.
Armstrong v. Armstrong, 248 Ark. 835, 837-38, 454 S.W.2d 660, 662 (1970).
140. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 248 Ark. 835, 838, 454 S.W.2d 660, 662 (1970)(quoting
Seaton v. Seaton, 221 Ark. 778, 255 S.W.2d 954 (1953)).
141. Id. at 839, 454 S.W.2d at 663. The court noted that the agreement covered nine
different areas. Id.
142. Id. For example, the husband agreed to pay alimony for the wife's life, and
agreed to support his daughter past the age of majority. The court had no power
under Arkansas law to make either of these awards. Id. at 839-40, 454 S.W.2d at
663.
143. Id. at 840, 454 S.W.2d at 663 (Fogleman, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 841, 454 S.W.2d at 664 (Fogleman, J., dissenting). Justice Fogleman com-
mented, "I cannot conceive of a situation in which the parties might go to greater
lengths to merge an agreement into a decree than they went here." Id.
145. Law v. Law, 248 Ark. 894, 902, 455 S.W.2d 854, 858 (1970)(Fogleman, J., dissent-
ing)(noted in Annotation, supra note 28, at 571).
146. 2 Ark. App. 168, 621 S.W.2d 1 (1981).
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sas Court of Appeals considered the status of an alimony provision in a
divorce settlement agreement. The court applied Armstrong to a situ-
ation in which the parties had entered into a written agreement con-
cerning alimony. The divorce court, in its decree, made no specific
reference to the alimony provided, but did recite that the parties had
reached an agreement settling property rights "'which was incorpo-
rated into this decree by reference and made a part thereof.' "147 In
applying Armstrong, the court of appeals referred to the divorce set-
tlement agreement as a "complete contract," and relied -on the facts
that the agreement made no reference to the divorce court's decree
and that the decree made no reference to alimony, either as provided
in the agreement or otherwise, to find that it constituted an "in-
dependent agreement" and not a stipulation.148 Sterling, thus, added a
gloss to the rule announced in Armstrong.
In Linehan v. Linehan,149 the Arkansas Court of Appeals again
faced the question of the status of a divorce settlement agreement and
applied one of the rules announced in Armstrong-that an agreement
that provides relief the court could not itself grant, is not intended to
be merged. In Linehan, the parties informed the divorce court on the
day of trial that they had negotiated an agreement which was read
into the record. The court referred to the agreement as a stipulation,
apparently applying the term in its more generally understood sense-
that is to mean a compromise reached between litigants, rather than
the term of art set out in Armstrong.150 The agreement provided that
it should be "incorporated by reference into the decree of divorce,"
and resolved every point in controversy between the divorcing parties.
The divorce court incorporated the entire agreement with no varia-
tions. 51 The court of appeals found that since the parties' alimony
provision was one the court could not have made,152 but rather was
based upon a negotiated bargain, the agreement must have been in-
tended to be an independent contract.153 Again, as in Armstrong, the
court was persuaded further by the comprehensiveness of the agree-
147. Id. at 169, 621 S.W.2d at 2.
148. Id. at 172, 621 S.W.2d at 3.
149. 8 Ark. App. 177, 649 S.W.2d 837 (1983).
150. Id. at 179-80, 649 S.W.2d at 838-39. Because Arkansas distinguishes between in-
dependent contracts, and what it labels mere "stipulations," use of the word stip-
ulation to refer to the parties in-court consensus, which the court found to be an
independent contract, unnecessarily confused the analysis. The court did explain
the two different meanings of "stipulation," perhaps clarifying matters some-
what. Id. at 180, 649 S.W.2d at 839.
151. Id. at 179, 649 S.W.2d at 838.
152. Id. at 181, 649 S.W.2d at 839. The parties agreed to a lump sum ($5,000) payable
over five years. A court award of such alimony in gross, according to the court of
appeals, would be contrary to a long line of Arkansas cases. Id.
153. Id.
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ment.154 Again, as in Armstrong, there was a dissent.
Accusing the majority of "further befuddling an important but al-
ready confusing area of our law," the dissent concluded that the agree-
ment was not only a stipulation in the generally understood sense, but
also under the rule articulated in Armstrong.s5 5 The dissent reasoned,
"[h]ere, the parties' agreement was stipulated-not contracted--and
the court's decree was based solely on those stipulations announced in
and approved by the chancery court.... [T]he parties' stipulations by
no stretch of the imagination conferred on either of them an in-
dependent contractual right."156
Thus, the Arkansas approach, like others we have examined, re-
sults in the evolution of a confusing, unpredictable body of law.
D. Statutory Solutions
1. Status of the Agreement
a. UMDA Approach
One way to clarify the matter of divorce settlement agreements is
to provide statutorily for the effect such agreements will have. With
its stated intention to "promote amicable settlement of disputes be-
tween parties to a marriage," the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
(UMDA) makes specific provision for divorce settlement agreements.
It addresses head on the questions of merger and incorporation, the
agreement's status following the divorce, and the availability of modi-
fication and judgment or contract remedies.157 In pertinent part, sec-
tion 306 of the UMDA provides as follows:
(b) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or for legal separation, the
terms of the separation agreement, except those providing for the support,
154. Id.
155. Id. at 181-83, 649 S.W.2d at 839-40 (Glaze, J., with whom Cooper, J., joined,
dissenting).
156. Id. at 182-83, 649 S.W.2d at 840.
157. UMDA § 306, 9A U.L.A. 216 (1987). As of 1987, eight jurisdictions had adopted
some version of the UMDA. Adopting states, however, may interpret these statu-
tory provisions somewhat differently. Further, not all states adopting the UMDA
did so without revision. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-317 (1976). The
UMDA as promulgated provides that an agreement set forth in the decree is en-
forceable as both a judgment (remedy: contempt, garnishment) and a contract
(remedy: contract damages), that the parties may preclude modification of provi-
sions except those relating to child support, custody, and visitation, and if they do
not preclude modification, any modification of the judgment automatically modi-
fies the agreement. Arizona's version, on the other hand, provides that terms set
forth in the decree are enforceable by all remedies available for enforcement of a
judgment, with no mention of contract remedies, and consistent with this, makes
quite different provisions for modification. Id. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.325
(1986). See also supra notes 78-96 and accompanying text.
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custody and visitation of children, are binding upon the court unless it finds,
... that the separation agreement is unconscionable.
(d) If the court finds that the separation agreement is not unconscionable as
to disposition of property or maintenance, and not unsatisfactory as to
support:
(1) unless the separation agreement provides to the contrary, its terms
shall be set forth in the decree of dissolution or legal separation and the par-
ties shall be ordered to perform them, or
(2) if the separation agreement provides that its terms shall not be set
forth in the decree, the decree shall identify the separation agreement and
state that the court has found the terms not unconscionable.
(e) Terms of the agreement set forth in the decree are enforceable by all
remedies available for enforcement of a judgment, including contempt, and
are enforceable as contract terms.
(f) Except for terms concerning the support, custody, or visitation of chil-
dren, the decree may expressly preclude or limit modification of terms set
forth in the decree if the separation agreement so provides. Otherwise, terms
of a separation agreement set forth in the decree are automatically modified
by modification of the decree. 15 8
Thus, the UMDA contemplates two types of agreements. One, the
hybrid contract/decree, occurs when the agreement is set forth in the
decree, and the parties are ordered to perform. It is enforceable as a
judgment and as a contract and is modifiable by the court, unless the
agreement expressly provides for nonmodification and the court ap-
proves. In this case, modification of the decree automatically modifies
the agreement. The other type, more like an independent contract,
arises when the agreement is not set forth in the decree pursuant to
the express provision to that effect by the parties. It remains as an
independent contract only, which has, however, been identified and
approved as not unconscionable by the court.
Questions inevitably arise, and, although the statute does not use
the words "incorporate," "incorporate by reference," or "merger,"
some courts interpreting UMDA-based statutes still employ these
terms to describe what has or has not occurred with respect to the
agreement. 1 5
9
In Yearout v. Yearout,160 the Washington Court of Appeals ad-
158. UMDA § 306, 9A U.L.A. 216 (1987).
159. For example, in Yearout v. Yearout, 41 Wash. App. 897, 898, 707 P.2d 1367, 1369
(1985), "[t]he Superior Court ... provided, by incorporating the written separa-
tion contract of the parties into the decree, that Mr. Yearout pay maintenance."
The court also said, "[t]he paragraph in the dissolution decree incorporating the
separation agreement reads." Id. The court further held: "[Iln the case before
us, the separation agreement clearly had been merged into the decree. Generally,
if a prior court decree confirms, approves, or incorporates by reference the terms
of a separation agreement a merger has occurred." Id. at 900, 707 P.2d at 1370.
160. 41 Wash. App. 897, 707 P.2d 1367 (1985).
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dressed whether, under its version of the UMDA,161 a particular di-
vorce decree had approved and set out a nonmodification clause
sufficiently to make it part of the decree. The court of appeals held:
[Trhe court emphasized full incorporation of the pertinent provisions of the
agreement in three ways: (1) 'incorporated herein by reference as iffully set
forth,' (2) perform all... obligations .... in the form and in the manner as set
forth therein,' and (3) 'each and every obligation of Respondent therein be-
comes a portion of this Decree.'1 6 2
The court of appeals' holding is consistent with the statute.
Although the divorce court did not set forth the agreement's provi-
sions word for word, it accomplished this in effect when it incorpo-
rated them by reference. 163 The court also expressly ordered the
parties to perform, thus complying with both requirements of the
statute.
However, the court clouded the issue with its explanation. Instead
of tracking the language of the statute and matching it to the language
of the divorce decree, the court of appeals quoted the provisions in the
divorce decree, and then explained:
[Tihe separation agreement clearly had been merged into the decree. Gener-
ally, if a prior court decree confirms, approves, or incorporates by reference
the terms of a separation agreement a merger has occurred.... Ultimately,
however, an appellate court will look to the intent of the parties and the trial
court as expressed in the documents themselves to determine whether a
merger has occurred. 1 6
4
Invocation of these tired, equivocal terms was unnecessary in light
of the clear provisions of the statute. More important, these terms
carry with them conceptual baggage that is inconsistent with the de-
sign of the UMDA as adopted by Washington.
Montana, too, adopted the UMDA without substantive changes,165
and its courts have considered the question of the status of a divorce
settlement agreement under the statute. In one case, In re Marriage
161. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.070 (1986). Washington adopted § 306 of the
UMDA without substantive changes.
162. Yearout v. Yearout, 41 Wash. App. 897, 899-900, 707 P.2d 1367, 1370 (1985).
163. Incorporation by reference is a perfectly acceptable way to describe what
amounts essentially to a mechanical process of including in one document (here
the decree) the terms of another identified or "referenced" document (here the
divorce settlement agreement) without actually repeating each and every term.
It is not the use of the term "incorporation by reference" as shorthand for actu-
ally copying an agreement that has caused confusion. Rather, it is the use of "in-
corporation" or incorporation by reference with the term "merger" to describe a
result carrying with it certain legal baggage that has caused confusion, because of
careless, inconsistent and frequently interchangeable use of the terms to describe
a variety of results. The Yearout court does this.
164. Yearout v. Yearout, 41 Wash. App. 897, 900, 707 P.2d 1367, 1370 (1985)(emphasis
added).
165. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-201 (1987).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
of Lorge,16 6 the Supreme Court of Montana had to determine the ap-
propriateness of an award of attorney's fees to a wife seeking to en-
force a divorce settlement agreement-the award being appropriate if
the divorce settlement agreement was set out in the decree and inap-
propriate if it remained merely a separate contract between the par-
ties. 6 7 The court quoted the Montana statute and then observed that
"the agreement did not provide 'that its terms shall not be set forth in
the decree,'168 but the parties did not request that it be incorporated
into the decree."169 The court concluded that the divorce court had
followed the procedures set forth in the statute. The divorce court
decided whether the terms of the agreement were "reasonable and not
unconscionable," and it did not set forth the terms of the agreement in
the decree. Therefore, the supreme court reasoned, the agreement
was a private contract between the parties, for "[w]hen the terms of an
agreement are not set forth in the decree, the agreement retains the
status of a private contract." 170
The Montana Supreme Court's reasoning, however, is not consis-
tent with the statute. The statute specifically provides that unless the
parties provide to the contrary in their agreement, it "shall be set forth
in the decree."171 It thus sets up a presumption that the agreement
will be set out in the decree, and thereby achieve the hybrid contract/
judgment status unless the parties provide to the contrary. If they
make no provision, as in Lorge, the presumption should control, and
the agreement should be set forth by the divorce court in its decree.
However, the Montana Supreme Court in Lorge reversed the pre-
sumption. While acknowledging that the agreement before it did not
specify that it should not be set forth in the decree, the court was per-
suaded by the fact that the parties did not specifically request that it
be incorporated and the fact that the divorce court did not set it forth
to justify the result that the agreement was a purely private contract.
The divorce court's action created an inconsistency that the supreme
court had to resolve. The divorce court's solution and especially its
explanation are contrary to the statutory provisions.
The problem, as recognized by the dissent,172 was created when the
166. 207 Mont. 423, 675 P.2d 115 (1984).
167. Id. at 427, 675 P.2d at 117.
168. Id. at 428, 675 P.2d at 117. The court here referred to and quoted the statutory
language of § 40-4-201(4)(a) (Montana's codification of the UMDA) which pro-
vides: "unless the separation agreement provides to the contrary, its terms shall
be set forth in the decree of dissolution or legal separation and the parties shall be
ordered to perform them." MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-201(4)(a) (1987).
169. In re Marriage of Lorge, 207 Mont. 423, 428, 675 P.2d 115, 117 (1984).
170. Id.
171. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-202(4)(a) (1987)(emphasis added).




divorce court, in the face of an agreement which did not expressly pre-
clude it, did not set forth the terms of the parties agreement in the
decree as the statute required. Thus, contrary to the majority's find-
ing that the "court followed the procedure prescribed in subsection 40-
4-201(4)(b),"173 the divorce court did not follow the statute when it
entered the divorce decree. When the agreement is silent with regard
to whether or not it should be set out, the parties simply have not met
the statutory requirement of "providing to the contrary." The pre-
sumption controls, and the court has no choice but to set forth the
agreement's provisions in its decree.174 Perhaps the suggestion in Sul-
livan -75 that the parties' remedy would have been to appeal the di-
vorce court's order should be applied here. The party seeking the
protective provision of the statute had notice that her desires had not
been accomplished, and that the court was not complying with the
provisions of the statute, and should have sought, in timely fashion, to
appeal and correct the order.
However, no appeal was made, and the resulting status of the
agreement was, therefore, ambiguous. In the face of this ambiguity,
the supreme court would have been better to apply the statute in a
straightforward fashion and to correct the error where it was made, as
the dissent suggested. Under the statute, the divorce court should
have set out the agreement in its decree,17 6 and by doing so provided
the wife with the protection and enforcement options offered by the
statute. It missed its duty in the first instance, so the traditional rule
of equity should have been applied, and that which ought to have been
done should be regarded as having been done.177 That is, the same
result could be achieved by invoking this equity principle, instead of
by manipulation of the statutory provisions.
As it is, the Montana Supreme Court unnecessarily injected ambi-
guity into application of the statute, which in effect set up a presump-
tion that an agreement will be set forth in the decree and imposed the
burden on the parties to avoid this by express language in the agree-
ment. The Montana Supreme Court in its explanation, however, im-
pliedly reversed this, shifting the burden to the parties to get the
agreement into the decree, rather than to keep it out.
By contrast, Missouri, which adopted the UMDA with some revi-
sions,1 78 has demonstrated a steady commitment to clarity and consis-
tency under the statute in its cases considering whether or not an
173. Id. at 428, 675 P.2d at 117.
174. Id. at 431, 675 P.2d at 119.
175. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
176. In re Marriage of Lorge, 207 Mont. 423, 431-32, 675 P.2d 115, 116 (1984); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 40-4-201(4)(a) (1987).
177. In re Marriage of Lorge, 207 Mont. 423, 431-32, 675 P.2d 115,119 (1984)(Sheehy, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
178. Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.325 (1986).
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agreement has been set forth in a decree, or survives as a contract. In
Haggard v. Haggard,179 the Missouri Supreme Court announced the
general rule under the statute: If the agreement was not expressly
excluded from the decree, it became part of the judgment.o8 0 Subse-
quent opinions by intermediate appellate courts applied the rule in
straightforward fashion.'18
In Bryson v. Bryson, 8 2 the court faced a situation in which a find-
ing of merger would have relieved the husband of all obligations to
make the payments, leaving the wife remediless. The parties had
agreed to a maintenance award based on a percentage of the husband's
income, which the divorce court had approved as not unconscionable.
The parties' separation agreement made no express provision that it
was to survive as a contract. Under the body of law that evolved in
Missouri prior to adoption of its UMDA-based Dissolution of Marriage
Act, such a percentage-based alimony award made by a court would be
deemed too indefinite to be enforced as a decree. 8 3 In a declaratory
judgment action brought by the wife, the trial court held that, under
the statute, the agreement had merged into the decree because the
parties did not provide to the contrary. Therefore, it concluded, the
agreement lost its contractual nature, and as a decree, it was unen-
forceable because it was too indefinite. 8 4
On appeal, the court resisted the temptation to achieve an equita-
ble result by manipulating the explicit statutory provisions regarding
whether or not an agreement survives a decree. Rather, it stated and
applied the rules to the facts and held that since the separation agree-
ment did not expressly provide that it would remain contractual, it
lost its contractual nature and became part of the decree.' 8 5 The
wife's remedy was an action for enforcement of the decree, which
raised the problem of the indefiniteness of the alimony provision. The
court then undertook a principled reanalysis of the old law regarding
the enforceability of an uncertain decree such as this.18 6 It observed
that "[t]he Dissolution of Marriage Act changed the law," and cited
the Missouri Supreme Court's statement in Haggard that "'[it is un-
clear whether the limitations which applied to decretal alimony
should also apply to .. .maintenance [under the new Dissolution of
179. 585 S.W.2d 480 (Mo. 1979).
180. Id. at 482.
181. E.g., Blank v. Blank, 698 S.W.2d 623 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Davis v. Davis, 687
S.W.2d 699 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Bryson v. Bryson, 624 S.W.2d 92 (Mo. Ct. App.
1981).
182. 624 S.W.2d 91 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
183. I- at 96.
184. Id. at 95-96.




Marriage Act]."'187 The court concluded that despite its indefinite-
ness, the decree was enforceable. The court noted that under the new
Act the divorce court was bound by the parties' agreement if it was
conscionable, and that the divorce court could enter a decree pursuant
to an agreement which it did not have the power to make in the ab-
sence of the agreement. From this, the court found that precedents
regarding unenforceability of indefinite alimony awards were inappli-
cable to decrees entered pursuant to agreements under the new Disso-
lution of Marriage Act.1'8
However, Missouri's law is not without its own complications. As
noted above, Missouri revised the UMDA when it adopted it. The leg-
islature did not retain the UMDA provision which would allow reme-
dies both in contract (i.e., damages) and on the judgment (i.e.,
contempt, garnishment, etc.) when an agreement is set forth in the
decree. Only judgment remedies are available. 8 9 As a result, an
agreement set out in the decree more closely resembles what has tra-
ditionally been called merger, as contract rights and remedies do not
survive its being set forth or included in the decree. Under the
UMDA, the options are an independent contract, approved by the
court as not unconscionable,190 or a hybrid contract/decree.191 By con-
trast, under the Missouri statute the two options are an independent
contract, or a decree based on but superseding the parties'
agreement. 92
One problem generated by the Missouri approach was faced by the
187. Id. at 97 (quoting Haggard v. Haggard, 585 S.W.2d 480, 482 (Mo. 1979)).
188. Id. at 97-98.
189. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act provides as follows: "Terms of the agree-
ment set forth in the decree are enforceable by all remedies available for enforce-
ment of a judgment, including contempt, and are enforceable as contract terms."
UMDA § 306(e), 9A U.L.A. 217 (1987).
The Missouri statute provides:
5. Terms of the agreement set forth in the decree are enforceable by all
remedies available for the enforcement of a judgment, and the court may
punish any party who willfully violates its decree to the same extent as is
provided by law for contempt of the court in any other suit or proceeding
cognizable by the court.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.325 (1986).
190. This option, as explained above, entitles the parties to contract remedies only,
and does not permit modification unless expressly provided for in the agreement.
UMDA § 306, 9A U.L.A. 216 (1987). See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying
text.
191. UMDA § 306, 9A U.L.A. 216 (1987). This option entitles the parties to both con-
tract remedies and judgment remedies, but the hybrid contract/decree is modifia-
ble by the court upon a proper showing by one party, unless the parties expressly
agree to the contrary and any modification of the decree also modifies the agree-
ment. See supra notes 157-58.
192. See Davis v. Davis, 687 S.W.2d 699, 701 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Haggard v. Haggard,
585 S.W.2d 480, 481-82 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
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Missouri Court of Appeals in Blank v. Blank.193 In Blank, the divorce
court specifically found the parties' agreement not unconscionable,
and proceeded, pursuant to the statute, to set it forth in the decree,
because the parties had not expressly precluded this. However, in set-
ting forth the agreement in the decree, the court inadvertently left out
several paragraphs of the agreement relating to spousal mainte-
nance.194 When the wife sought to enforce the agreement's mainte-
nance provisions, the husband argued that because the Missouri
statute provided that the agreement, once set out in the decree was
enforceable as a judgment only, it, therefore, was superseded by and
merged into the decree. Since the maintenance provisions were omit-
ted from the decree, he reasoned the agreement no longer existed, and
the provisions were rendered a nullity.195
The court of appeals disagreed, citing the statute's express purpose
of encouraging parties to enter agreements which they should be able
to rely upon as enforceable. To serve that purpose, the court held that
the provisions omitted from the decree would remain enforceable as
contractually undertaken obligations, and were not superseded by the
decree.196
Of course, the result is not perfectly reconcilable with the statute,
but then perfect reconciliation was made impossible by the divorce
court's error. Given that no choice would precisely comport with the
statutory provisions, the court at least resisted the temptation to ma-
nipulate the question of merger. What is most important about the
decision is that the Missouri court, when faced with a compelling situ-
ation which essentially fell between the cracks, focused on the pur-
pose of the statute-encouragement of private ordering by
agreement-and recognized that to achieve that purpose, it had to pro-
tect certainty of contract and avoid manipulation of the merger issue.
The parties in Blank followed the statute and did exactly what was
prescribed in order to have their agreed-to terms become an enforcea-
ble judgment of the court. It was the clerical mistake that offered the
husband a loophole. The court of appeals reasoned that the obligor
should not be allowed later to escape the obligations he freely under-
took in the contract because of the clerical error of the divorce court
in entering the divorce decree, as this would undermine predictability
of contract enforcement and dissuade parties from entering
agreements.19 7
However, a more appropriate result would have been to leave the
parties to the remedy of direct appeal to correct the divorce court's
193. 698 S.W.2d 623 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
194. Id. at 624.
195. Id- at 625-26.




error, as suggested earlier in connection with Lorge and Sullivan.398
Of course the parties did not, in fact, appeal in this case, and this ap-
proach would leave this wife with no remedy. But she could have ap-
pealed and had notice of her grounds by virtue of the court's obvious
error in approving the agreement in toto but failing to set out all of its
terms.
Other problems arise as well under UMDA-type provisions, and
situations will persist in which no easy determination can be made.
For example, in Young v. Burkholder,199 the Arizona Court of Ap-
peals, applying that state's UMDA-based divorce code,2 00 was faced
with a case in which it found the language of the agreement and the
decree made it quite unclear what the parties intended, and what the
court assumed it had accomplished.2 01
The court looked to the statute for guidance, and noted that the
statute contemplated two possibilities: (1) that the agreement is su-
perseded by the decree and no contract rights or remedies survive; or
198. See supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 130-35 and
accompanying text.
199. 142 Ariz 415, 690 P.2d 134 (Ct. App. 1984).
200. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-317 (1976). Arizona modeled its legislation after the
UMDA, but like Missouri, left out the provision for a hybrid contract/decree. For
a fuller discussion of the difference between this legislation and the UMDA, see
supra note 157, and the discussion of Missouri law, supra notes 178-96 and accom-
panying text.
201. Burkholder involved child support and not alimony. However, the provision in
question concerned post-majority support during college, which would not be en-
forceable as a court award, but would be as a contract. Young v. Burkholder, 142
Ariz. 415, 417-18, 690 P.2d 134, 136-37 (Ct. App. 1984). According to the court of
appeals opinion, the agreement provided as follows:
[1Irrespective of whether either of the parties secures a decree of dissolu-
tion, this Agreement in whole or in part shall be binding upon the par-
ties hereto and upon their agents, employees, representatives, heirs,
executors, administrators, successors and assigns.
... The parties hereto understand, covenant, and agree that this
Agreement shall be submitted for approval to the Superior Court of Ari-
zona, in and for the county of Maricopa, in event an action for dissolution
is filed and that at the sole request of the moving party with the approval
of the Court, this Agreement shall be incorporated by the said Court in
the Judgment and Decree of Dissolution, the same as if fully set forth
therein. This Agreement is and shall be considered strictly as an agree-
ment settling and adjusting their mutual rights and obligations and their
rights respecting property, and the same being the free and voluntary act
of each of the parties hereto.
Id. at 417, 690 P.2d at 136.
The decree entered by the divorce court referred to this agreement as follows:
The Court finds ... the spouses have agreed to a written property settle-
ment agreement dated the 28th day of February, 1974, a signed copy of
which has been filed with this Court and which is hereby incorporated
by reference herein setting forth the disposition of the property and
terms of support which the Court finds fair and reasonable.
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(2) that the contract survives but no judgment rights or remedies sur-
vive. The court then concluded that "[p]ursuant to the statute, incor-
poration causing merger would be the rule and incorporation merely
to identify the agreement would be the exception... and would occur
if the 'separation agreement provides that its terms shall not be set
forth in the decree.' "202
While this analysis of the statute suggests a straightforward ap-
proach, the court allowed itself to be drawn into interpreting the in-
tentions of the parties by its perception of ambiguity in the agreement
and decree under consideration. Acknowledging that the agreement
before it did not expressly provide that its terms should not be set
forth in the decree, the court of appeals noted that the agreement did
state that it should be incorporated only at the request of the moving
party, which the court reasoned, gave the moving party the right to
decide whether to request that the agreement be incorporated or not.
The wife, who was the moving party, maintained, at least at the late
date of litigation, that she had not intended to "merge" the agreement,
and buttressed her argument by language of the agreement which re-
peatedly alluded to its finality and enforceability as a contract. Fur-
ther, she argued, merger would be absurd because it would render
unenforceable the husband's promise to pay for the children's college
educations.03
Adding to the confusion was the language of the decree. Despite
the absence of a non-merger clause in the agreement, the divorce
court did not, in its decree, order the parties to perform the terms of
the agreement as required by the statute.2 04 Therefore, the court de-
cided that it could not conclude positively from the language used
whether the divorce court was merely identifying and approving the
agreement, intending it to survive.205 Thus, the court held that the
question of whether the agreement survived had to be determined by
analyzing the parties' intentions.206
Arguably a clear, and relatively easy, result could be obtained by
applying the statute strictly. Under this approach, because the parties
did not provide to the contrary in their agreement, it merged into and
was superseded by the decree. 207 This would be consistent with the
court's analysis that, under the statute, incorporation causing merger
is the rule and incorporation merely to identify is the exception.208
202. Id. at 419, 690 P.2d at 138.
203. Id. at 419-20, 690 P.2d at 138-39.
204. Id. at 420, 690 P.2d at 139.
205. Id.
206. Id. At the beginning of the case, the court discussed Arizona law prior to the
adoption of the UMDA-based statute and addressed how the intentions of the
parties could be determined. Id. at 418-19, 690 P.2d at 137-38.
207. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-317(c) (1976).
208. Young v. Burkholder, 142 Ariz. 415, 419, 690 P.2d 134, 138 (Ct. App. 1984).
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However, although the facts of this case are not as compelling as those
in Hereford,209 they certainly do beg for a fair result, explaining why
the court let itself be drawn back into considering the vague unarticu-
lated intentions of the parties. The father had contractually promised
to provide for the children's college educations, presumably in ex-
change for some consideration from the wife. The court approved the
agreement.2 10 Should the husband be permitted to renege on his bar-
gain? Strict application of the no-express-provision-to-the-contrary
rule would require this result. However, by ignoring the individual
equities of the case, development of a coherent, predictable body of
law would better serve the broader goal of providing parties with a
certain base from which to bargain.
b. Other Statutory Approaches
Other states, although not adopting the UMDA, have attempted,
through statutes, to simplify determination of the status, modifiability,
and remedies of divorce settlement agreements. 211 Prior to adoption
of a statute addressing the issue, the California courts also engaged in
determination of the elusive intentions of the parties,2 2 an analysis
which, as one California case noted, caused the case law to develop
"complicated distinctions," and resulted in a "constant stream of liti-
gation wherein the courts were required to interpret language of
agreements and decrees which were not always as clearly drawn as
could be desired."21 3
However, rather than specifically addressing merger or survival of
the divorce settlement agreement following entry of the decree, the
California statute deals directly with two of the questions which arise,
or more accurately, two of the results which flow therefrom: (1) what
remedies are available to the parties; and (2) whether the agreed-to
provisions can be modified later by the court. The statute provides
that all orders for support "based on the agreement shall be deemed
law-imposed and shall be deemed made under the power of the court
209. In re Estate of Hereford, 250 S.E.2d 45 (W. Va. 1978). In Hereford, the separation
agreement provided for alimony beyond the death of the payor but the decree did
not make that clear. The payee spouse was, at the time of her husband's death, 71
years old, in a nursing home, and unable to support herself. Id. at 48-49.
210. Young v. Burkholder, 142 Ariz. 415, 421, 690 P.2d 134, 140 (Ct. App. 1984).
211. In re Marriage of Smiley, 53 Cal. App. 3d 228,232, 125 Cal. Rptr. 717, 719 (1975).
212. See In re Marriage of Smiley, 53 Cal. App. 3d 228, 231-32, 125 Cal. Rptr. 718-19
(1975); Flynn v. Flynn, 42 Cal. 2d 55, 58-59, 265 P.2d 865, 866-67 (1954). For a
discussion of the factors considered in determining the intentions of the parties,
see Flynn v. Flynn, 42 Cal. 2d 55, 265 P.2d 865 (1954). For a discussion of the
development of the law in California, see In re Marriage of Smiley, 53 Cal. App.
3d 228, 231-33, 125 Cal. Rptr. 717, 718-20 (1975).




to make the orders."214 This gives the parties the remedies available
to enforce court decreed support (i.e., contempt, levy of execution)215
without making any determination with respect to merger or
incorporation.
With respect to the question of modifiability, the statute provides:
Mhe provisions of any agreement or order for the support of either party
shall be subject to subsequent modification or revocation by court order...
except to the extent that any written agreement, or, if there is no written
agreement, any oral agreement entered into in open court between the par-
ties, specifically provides to the contrary.21 6
Again, independent of a determination of merger or incorporation,
the statute specifies the result. However, in this case, the parties may,
by specifically providing for nonmodification, avoid the statutorily im-
posed result. What constitutes language in an agreement which "spe-
cifically provides to the contrary," is the hook that throws a seemingly
clear rule into uncertainty. 17
Unfortunately, the California statute applies these clarifications
only to spousal maintenance and child support. Agreements dealing
strictly with property division, though specifically contemplated by
the statute,2 18 are left to the old law of determining the intention of
the parties.2 1 9 While it is true that many of the most troubling
problems arise because of the modifiability and enforcement issues as-
sociated only with child support and spousal maintenance, the ques-
tion of merger can affect property settlements as well. For example,
in In re Marriage of Lane,220 the question arose as to whether the wife
had a breach of warranty action (a contract remedy) against her hus-
band for not fully disclosing the extent and value of his assets when
their divorce settlement agreement contained an express warranty
that all information provided to the wife and her counsel regarding
the husband's property was accurate and current. If the agreement
had merged, the wife would have no remedy. The question of the fair-
ness of the agreement on its face was determined by the court when it
214. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4811(b) (West 1983 & Supp. 1987).
215. Id. § 4380 (West 1983); see id. § 4383 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987).
216. Id. § 4811 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987).
217. A full analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this article. However, consider-
ations range from the effectiveness of general boilerplate provisions, see
Fukuzaki v. Superior Court, 120 Cal. App. 3d 454, 174 Cal. Rptr. 536 (1981); In re
Marriage of Nielson, 100 Cal. App. 2d 874,161 Cal. Rptr. 272 (1980), to questions of
more specific versus more general provisions in a case where the question of
modifiability was not addressed directly, see In re Marriage of Forum, 145 Cal.
App. 3d 599, 193 Cal. Rptr. 596 (1983). For a full discussion of this line of cases in
California up to 1984, see In re Marriage of Hufford, 152 Cal. App. 3d 825, 199 Cal.
Rptr. 726 (1984).
218. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4800, 4802, 4811 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987).
219. See In re Marriage of Lane, 165 Cal. App. 3d 1143, 1147-50, 211 Cal. Rptr. 262, 265-
67 (1985).
220. 165 Cal. App. 3d 1143, 211 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1985).
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approved the agreement, making the question of disclosure res judi-
cata.221 If, however, the agreement had not merged, the wife retained
her breach of contract action on the express warranty of full disclo-
sure.222 The court referred to the 1954 case of Flynn v. Flynn223 for
the factors to be applied in determining whether an agreement
merged into a decree, and was thus enmeshed in making the very sort
of difficult, unpredictable distinctions the statute had eliminated in
the support and maintenance contexts.
A better approach would be to address the status of the agreement
across the board, thus determining all available options and not to re-
strict the statutory classification to child support and spousal mainte-
nance only. This, however, must be left to the legislature to
accomplish, and the court had to deal with the statute as it was
drafted.
The law of Massachusetts presents a curious internal contrast, and
also raises one of the conceptual complexities inherent in the "hybrid"
theory which permits the agreement to become a decree of the court
and survive as a contract as well. The internal inconsistency arises
from the fact that under Massachusetts law a divorce settlement
agreement may come into play in two different contexts: (1) pursuant
to a traditional contested fault divorce;224 or (2) pursuant to the Mas-
sachusetts no-fault statute.2 2
A couple seeking a traditional fault divorce may enter an agree-
ment and present it to the court. In this instance, under the judicially
developed rule, unless the parties expressly provide to the contrary,
the agreement will survive a subsequent divorce decree, even if the
decree incorporates the agreement by reference.2 26
On the other hand, a couple seeking a divorce under Massachu-
setts' expedited no-fault statute,227 which requires the parties to pres-
ent to the court a notarized, comprehensive separation agreement in
order to qualify for an expedited order, must act not to achieve
merger, but to prevent it. According to the statute, the court, upon
approval of an agreement's provisions, must incorporate and merge
221. Id. at 1146-47, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 264-65.
222. Id. at 1149, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 266.
223. 42 Cal. 2d 55, 265 P.2d 865 (1954).
224. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 208, § 1 (West 1987).
225. Id.
226. Swift v. Swift, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 875, 391 N.E.2d 931 (1979).
227. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 1A, B (West 1987). Other states have similar
consensual no-fault provisions requiring submission of comprehensive divorce
settlement agreements in order to entitle the parties to the expedited process.
See, eg., Taylor v. Taylor, 392 So. 2d 1145 (Miss. 1981)(considering questions of
incorporation, modification, and survival of contract remedies under the Missis-
sippi irreconcilable differences statute); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-2 (Supp. 1986);
N.Y. DoM REL. LAw §§ 170, 236 (McKinney 1986); Oio REv. CODE ANN.
§ 3105.63 to .65 (Anderson Supp. 1987).
19s8
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:235
the agreement, unless the parties specify in the agreement that it
should be incorporated but not merged.228
While certainly not a major defect, the inconsistency between the
common law rule and Massachusetts' statutory provision can only cre-
ate confusion and certainly has the potential for trapping unwary par-
ties.229 For example, if parties relied on a form agreement which
happened to be an agreement drafted pursuant to a traditional di-
vorce, it might very well not include a nonmerger clause, even though
that is what was accomplished under the traditional rule, and what the
no-fault parties intended. To be sure, diligence by parties would avoid
this. However, there is no reason to create the risk when the statute
simply could have conformed to the common law rule that presumed
survival instead of merger. If the legislature was determined for good
reason to reverse the presumption, then the better approach would
have been to do so consistently for all divorce settlement agreements.
2. Court Modification of "Hybrid" Decrees
a. UMDA Approach
The other problem, which arises in Massachusetts and other "hy-
brid" jurisdictions in which the agreement may exist as both decree
and contract, involves what happens to the agreement (the contract)
when the court is asked to modify the decree with respect to alimony
or child support. While as a general rule, contracts are not modifiable
unilaterally by court order,230 courts may modify alimony and child
support, visitation, and custody provisions upon request of either party
and upon a showing of changed circumstances.2 3 1 The question be-
228. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 1A (West 1987).
229. The Massachusetts Legislature did remedy another source of confusion created
by the language of an earlier version of § 1A when it revised the statute in 1985.
As originally passed the statue provided that the agreement "shall be incorpo-
rated and merged into said order, and by agreement of the parties it may also
remain as an independent contract." MAss. GEN. LAwS ANN. ch. 208, § IA (West
Supp. 1985)(amended 1985).
Of course, as generally understood, merger means the agreement no longer
exists but is superseded by the order. In Stansel v. Stansel, 385 Mass. 510, 432
N.E.2d 691 (1982), Massachusetts' highest court explained that the statute could
not use the term "merger" in its technical sense, or the parties could not by agree-
ment cause the separation agreement to survive as an independent contract. Id.
at 513, 432 N.E.2d at 694.
The statute was subsequently revised to read, in pertinent part, as follows:
"The agreement either shall be incorporated and merged into said judgment or
by agreement of the parties, it shall be incorporated and not merged, but shall
survive and remain as an independent contract." MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. cl. 208,
§ 1A (West 1987).
230. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
231. Knox v. Remick, 371 Mass. 433, 433-38, 358 N.E.2d 432, 434-36 (1976). See also
supra notes 28, 32-33 and accompanying text.
Some jurisdictions will permit parties to agree that spousal maintenance will
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comes, does modification by the court of its decree modify the agree-
ment, or does the agreement stand, and entitle the party to contract
remedies for the difference between the court modified amount and
that provided for in the agreements?232
The UMDA resolves the problem by providing in the hybrid situa-
tion233 that unless the agreement precludes modification altogether,
which it may do except with respect to child related matters, any mod-
not be modifiable. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hereford, 250 S.E.2d 45 (W. Va. 1978);
UMDA § 306(f), 9A U.L.A. 217 (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-86 (West
1986). Others provide that, when an order is based on an agreement, a stricter
standard of changed circumstances must be applied to modification of spousal
maintenance. See, e.g., Braine v. Braine, 127 Vt. 211, 213-14, 243 A.2d 797, 799
(1968)(petitioner bears burden of establishing changed circumstances by showing
cause for being excused from presumptively fair and binding promise to per-
form); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(9)(b) (McKinney 1986). Still others always
will modify a provision for spousal support. See, e.g., Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139,
149, 416 A.2d 45, 50 (1980)(divorce settlement agreements enforceable in equity,
and equitable authority of court to modify spousal maintenance cannot be re-
stricted); Spingola v. Spingola, 91 N.M. 737, 741, 580 P.2d 958, 962 (1978)(New
Mexico statute providing for modification of spousal maintenance implictly en-
grafted into any agreement incorporated by court even in face of specific
nonmodification clause).
Child support, custody, and visitation matters, on the other hand, are, accord-
ing to the virtually universal rule, always modifiable upon a proper showing, the
justifications being that the court must always consider the best interest of the
child, and that the parents cannot bargain away the rights of the child. See, e.g.,
UMDA § 306(f), 9A U.L.A. 217 (1987)(ability of parties to preclude later modifica-
tion does not apply to terms concerning the support, custody, or visitation of chil-
dren); Nooner v. Nooner, 278 Ark. 360, 364, 645 S.W.2d 671, 674 (1983)(regardless
of what language in independent contract states, party has right to seek change in
child support); Napoleon v. Napoleon, 59 Haw. 619, 624, 585 P.2d 1270, 1273-74
(1978)(mother cannot waive right to seek support for minor child); Meehan v.
Meehan, 425 N.E.2d 157, 160 (Ind. 1981)(child support order entered pursuant to
terms of settlement agreement and intended as forever determinative by parties
is of no consequence to question whether order should be modified); Knox v.
Remick, 371 Mass. 433, 437-38, 358 N.E.2d 432,436 (1976)(court may recast burden
of support for child); Doty v. Doty, 37 Tenn. App. 120, 124-25, 260 S.W.2d 411, 413
(1952)(agreement does not deprive court of statutory power to modify agreement
especially where support of child is involved); Grijalva v. Grijalva, 310 S.E.2d 193,
197 (W. Va. 1983)(welfare of child is central to modify support and parents cannot
contract away rights of their children); QAL. CIV. CODE § 4801 (West 1983 & Supp.
1987)("orders for child support, even when there has been an agreement between
the parties on the subject of child support, may be modified or revoked at any
time at the discretion of the court" even when agreement between parties ad-
dresses child support).
232. As is explained in one Massachusetts case, the legal effect of the reduction of the
decree aspect of the hybrid decree/contract is to remove the threat of contempt
proceedings against the obligor. The obligee may recover in a contract action for
the difference between the amount agreed to and that ordered after modification.
Binder v. Binder, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 751, 758, 390 N.E. 260, 265 (1979).
233. That is, where both contract and judgment remedies are available. See UMDA




ification of the decree automatically modifies the agreement. 234
b. Other Approaches
Other possible resolutions involve byzantine combinations of dif-
fering rules for child support and spousal maintenance, and for modi-
fication up or modification down, with damages available in some
cases and not in others. Analysis of this complex area is beyond the
scope of this article, but the nature of the problem may be gleaned
from pursuing lines of cases in Massachusetts 23 5 and Pennsylvania.23 6
Kansas has addressed the problem with a straightforward statutory
provision.237 Divorce settlement agreements must be presented to the
court for approval in order to be binding.238 If the court finds the
agreement valid, just, and equitable, it must be incorporated into the
decree.239 The result of incorporation is a hybrid contract/decree of
sorts. The agreement continues to be effective and offers the parties
contract remedies, 24 0 but they also have the benefit of judgment reme-
dies such as contempt and garnishment.241 However, even though the
agreement is incorporated, other than with respect to provisions relat-
ing to children, it cannot be modified except as provided by the agree-
ment itself, or as later agreed to by both parties.242 While this
nonmodification provision does simplify the problems outlined above,
it also creates the possibility of harsh results. Divorce settlement
agreements are intended to extend long into the future, a future that
parties may not be able to anticipate accurately. Thus, changed cir-
cumstances may make an initially fair agreement unreasonable.243
Another way to resolve the problem of the hybrid contract/decree
is simply to eliminate it. Similar to Kansas, under an Indiana stat-
ute,2 44 the agreement must be brought before the court.245 The agree-
ment brought to the court, however, does not survive independent of
234. UMDA § 306(f), 9A U.L.A. 217 (1987).
235. See Stansel v. Stansel, 385.Mass. 510, 432 N.E.2d 691 (1982); Knox v. Remick, 371
Mass. 433, 358 N.E.2d 432 (1976); Ross v. Ross, 371 Mass. 439, 358 N.E.2d 437
(1976); Binder v. Binder, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 751, 390 N.E.2d 260 (1979).
236. See supra cases cited in note 75 and accompanying text.
237. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610 (Supp. 1987).
238. In re Estate of Loughmiller, 229 Kan. 584, 591, 629 P.2d 156, 161 (1981).
239. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(b)(3) (Supp. 1987).
240. Oehme v. Oehrne, 10 Kan. App. 2d 73, 691 P.2d 1325 (1984); Long v. Brooks, 6 Kan.
App. 2d 963, 965, 636 P.2d 242, 244 (1981).
241. Long v. Brooks, 6 Kan. App. 2d 963, 966-67, 636 P.2d 242, 244-45 (1981).
242. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610 (Supp. 1987).
243. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Hufford, 152 Cal. App. 3d 825, 829, 199 Cal. Rptr. 726,
728 (1981).
244. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-10 (Burns 1987).
245. Anderson v. Anderson, 399 N.E.2d 391, 398 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979). See also Meehan
v. Meehan, 425 N.E.2d 157, 159 (Ind. 1981).
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the decree, once it is incorporated and merged.24 6 While this approach
has the virtue of simplicity, it also restricts the remedies available.
For any variety of procedural, strategic, and practical reasons, a party
may find contract remedies more useful than judgment remedies, or
the other way around.2 47
And despite its simplicity, questions still arise under the Indiana
statute concerning what constitutes incorporation and merger. The
difficulty arises because incorporation and merger result from court
approval of the agreement or individual provisions. When the divorce
court clearly articulates what it has done, no problem arises. How-
ever, when the divorce court's decree is not explicit, questions arise.
In such cases, an invitation is made to speculate and draw inferences
regarding what the court intended when it appeared to approve the
agreement or some provision, but did not expressly merge it.
For example, in Meehan v. Meehan,24 8 the divorce court did not
expressly merge the parties' divorce settlement agreement into its de-
cree. Rather, the court only approved the agreement on its face, incor-
porating it by paraphrasing its terms and by reference to it.249 The
intermediate appellate court, while acknowledging that the statute re-
quired express incorporation and merger, nonetheless found that the
divorce court had intended merger, and analyzed the agreement as
merged.250 The supreme court reversed, stating that the statute re-
quires express language merging the agreement. Consequently, the
supreme court reasoned, a court must "carefully delineate in express
and unequivocal terms those portions which it is incorporating and
246. Cf. Anderson v. Anderson, 399 N.E.2d 391, 398-99 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979).
247. See, ag., Young v. Burkholder, 142 Ariz. 415,690 P.2d 134 (Ct. App. 1984) (because
court's continuing jurisdiction to enforce support decree limited to situation in-
volving minor children, enforcement of agreement to pay child college expenses
can be achieved only in contract action); In re Marriage of Lane, 165 Cal. App. 3d
1143, 1147, 211 Cal. Rptr. 262, 264 (1985)(when separation agreement was exe-
cuted with warranty that information and data furnished by husband were accu-
rate and complete, warranty offered wife remedy in contract action for its breach
by husband's fraudulent failure to disclose, while attack on decree for fraud based
on nondisclosure would be barred by res judicata). For a full discussion of Lane,
see supra notes 219-23 and accompanying text. Cf. Casper v. Casper, 359 Pa.
Super. 559, 565, 519 A.2d 493, 496-97 (1986)(discussing an agreement deemed en-
tered as an order but surviving an agreement, the court said, "[t]he general rea-
son for entering a support agreement as a court order is to enlist the equitable
powers of the court").
248. 425 N.E.2d 157 (Ind. 1981). Meehan involved child support, further complicating
the analysis, though not affecting its applicability here.
249. Id. at 159.
250. Id. The intermediate court explained: "[T]he incorporation and merger... [were]
effected by paraphrase and reference. Nevertheless, we will consider the appeal
in light of the terms of the agreement as if fully approved, incorporated, and
merged into the decree. Id. (quoting Meehan v. Meehan, 415 N.E.2d 762, 765 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1981)).
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merging into its order."251 The supreme court explained that not only
was such a rule consistent with the statutory provision, but was vital
to effective appellate review.252 Whether the agreement is approved
or not must be inferred from the divorce court's incorporation and
merger of the provision in question. Therefore, if a provision is not
clearly and expressly incorporated and merged, the appropriate infer-
ence under the statute, according to the Indiana Supreme Court, is
that the provision was not approved.253 The Indiana court rejected the
invitation to engage in conjecture, but rather set out a clear standard,
requiring express, unequivocal language from divorce courts to accom-
plish incorporation and merger. This not only assists rational appel-
late review as the court suggested, but also insures that the parties
will have clear notice of grounds for appeal, avoiding the problem that
arose in Sullivan.254
Another approach, applied by North Carolina, offers a variation on
the Indiana theme. It does not require the parties to bring the agree-
ment to the court for approval, but if they do, "it will no longer be
treated as a contract." 255 The North Carolina court announcing this
rule suggested that its results would not be harsh because the parties
could avoid the burdens and limitations of a court judgment simply by
not coming to court with the agreement.256 In that case, they could
preserve the contract to be enforced and modified under traditional
contract principles. 257 However, again, this rule puts the parties in the
position of choosing between remedies, rather than having both a con-
tract and a judgment remedy. Also, permitting court review of the
fairness of the agreement in either instance would better serve the
ends of justice.
There are, of course, other variations, but the approaches analyzed
above describe the spectrum, and highlight the problems in this area.
III. CONCLUSION
Of course, as in any difficult area of the law, there are no simple
solutions to the problems surrounding divorce settlement agreements.
If there were, certainly the thoughtful judges and lawyers who face
the reality of these problems on a daily basis would have found and
applied them. However, we can draw certain conclusions from the





254. See supra notes 123-35 and accompanying text.




The first, most obvious, and most pressing need is for clarity. Ap-
pellate courts and legislatures must state unequivocally what is re-
quired to accomplish or avoid merger; parties must articulate clearly
what they intend to accomplish in their agreements; and divorce
courts must express precisely what they mean to do with respect to
agreements brought before them.
A. A Clear Standard
Whether set by the legislature,258 or by the courts,25 9 a clear, pre-
cise standard must be articulated which will inform parties of what
they must do or say in order to achieve the results they desire. A good
way to achieve such a standard is through application of a presump-
tion that the parties may, by express provision to the contrary, rebut,
and therefore avoid. The presumption may be either that the agree-
ment is presumed to merge, absent express provision to the con-
trary,260 or the reverse, that the agreement is presumed not to merge
unless the parties expressly provide to the contrary.2 6' Similarly, in
jurisdictions that allow for the wholly-independent contract, or for the
hybrid contract/decree suggested by the UMDA,262 analogous pre-
sumptions could be applied. The value of applying a presumption as
opposed to simply relying on the parties to state their intentions is
that it gives the court definite guidance in the case in which the parties
have not expressly stated their intentions. When the agreement is si-
lent or equivocal, the presumption controls.2 63
Critical to the success of such an approach is a clear, unequivocal
articulation of the presumption, perhaps supported by an explanation
of its motivation. Justice Neely's opinion in Hereford sets a fine exam-
ple.2 6 4 But no rule will solve the problem if it is not construed strictly
258. See, eg., UMDA § 306, 9A U.L.A. 216 (1987); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-317(c)
(1976); CAL. Civ. CODE § 4811 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-
11.5-10 (Burns 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610 (Supp. 1987); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 208, § IA (West 1987); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-2 (Supp. 1987); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 452.325 (1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 170, 236 (McKinney 1986); OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 3105.63 to .65 (Anderson 1980 & Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.09.070 (1986).
259. See, e.g., Phillips v. Phillips, 93 Idaho 384, 387, 462 P.2d 49, 52 (1969); In re Estate
of Hereford, 250 S.E.2d 45, 52 (W. Va. 1978).
260. See eg., Phillips v. Phillips, 93 Idaho 384, 387, 462 P.2d 49, 52 (1969); In re Estate
of Hereford, 250 S.E.2d 45, 52 (W. Va. 1978).
261. See Swift v. Swift, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 875, 876, 391 N.E.2d 930, 931 (1979). See supra
note 226 and accompanying text.
262. UMDA § 306, 9A U.L.A. 216 (1987). See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying
text.
263. E.g., In re Marriage of Lorge, 207 Mont. 423, 431, 675 P.2d 115,119 (1984) (Sheehy,
J., dissenting).




and applied consistently by the courts. Judges must resist the tempta-
tion to manipulate rules to achieve equitable ends in individual
cases. 265 The results may be harsh in a few instances, but in the long
run fairness will be better served by eliminating the ambiguity and,
along with it, the traps that now exist for the unwary who negotiate,
bargain, and agree based on certain assumptions, only later to find out
that the basis of their bargain was illusory.266
As suggested above, it matters little whether the presumption fa-
vors merger or nomerger, hybrid or independent contract. This may
seem arbitrary, but in this context, it is less important what the rule is,
than that there is a rule,267 and that it is clear, strictly construed, and
consistently applied. However, the presumption adopted should be ap-
plied consistently through the area of divorce settlement contracting
to avoid the problem identified with the Massachusett's approach.268
Given an unambiguous standard, the parties must draft their
agreements carefully to conform to the standard, and to express un-
equivocally their intentions in terms of that standard.2 69 The parties
must realize that courts will not strain to discern their intentions
when those intentions have not been stated clearly. In such instances,
the presumption will control.
As important, divorce courts faced with divorce settlement agree-
ments must state clearly what they have decided in each case, in lan-
guage which conforms with the standard set.270 This serves a number
of purposes. First, and most obvious, the decree must inform the par-
265. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
266. See supra text accompanying note 102.
267. Cf. Day v. Day, 80 Nev. 386, 389, 395 P.2d 321, 322-23 (1964)(recognizing the neces-
sity for an arbitrary rule while noting that enforcement rights were of such sig-
nificance that the issue of agreement survival must be addressed by the trial
court).
268. See supra notes 224-29 and accompanying text.
269. See Phillips v. Phillips, 93 Idaho 384, 387, 462 P.2d 49, 52 (1969)("In the absence of
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, it will be presumed that.. . the
agreement is merged into the decree of divorce, is enforceable as a part thereof
and if necessary may be modified by the court in the future."). Clearly, to pre-
serve contractual remedies in a jurisdiction following such a standard, and to
overcome the significant burden of proof attached to the presumption, careful
drafting and unequivocal language must be employed. See H. CLARK, supra note
1, § 18.8, at 783.
270. Phillips v. Phillips, 93 Idaho 384, 386,467 P.2d 49,51 (1969)(trial courts must make
conclusions and findings on the subject of integration and merger at the time the
divorce decree issues in order to alleviate problems attempting to ascertain intent
after the fact by "technical hairsplitting"); Meehan v. Meehan, 425 N.E.2d 157,159
(Ind. 1981)(since a trial court has discretion to accept, modify, or reject in whole
or part of settlement agreement, it is "vital to effective and intelligent appellate
review that express and unequivocal language be required to effectuate the incor-
poration and merger of a settlement agreement," since attempts to decipher trial
courts' true intentions have inevitably led to conclusions that are not based solely
on the court's actual orders and entries as they should be).
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ties of what their rights and obligations are in a straightforward man-
ner if they are to be expected to comply with it.271 Additionally, a
clear decree permits rational appellate review of subsequent attempts
to modify or enforce agreements, 27 2 and insures that the parties have
sufficient notice so they may protect their rights through direct appeal
when appropriate.2 73 The divorce court must, in its decree, articulate
exactly what it has decided with sufficient clarity to give the parties
notice of possible grounds of appeal. For example, if the court, with-
out grounds, refuses to execute the parties intentions with respect to
merger or not, or fails to do what the statute requires to accomplish
those intentions, the parties may appeal. However, if the court's de-
cree is ambiguous, as it was in Sullivan 274 and Nakashima,2 75 the ag-
grieved party may not know she has grounds for appeal until much
later than the statutory appeal period, when the question arises in a
collateral proceeding.2 7 6 Then it will be too late under this approach.
With respect to rational review, if the divorce court does not state
clearly what it intends to do concerning the parties' agreement, an ap-
pellate court, faced with a question concerning the status of the agree-
ment,2 7 7 would be left to conjecture and speculation. The appellate
court would, thus, again become enmeshed in the impossible task of
divining unarticulated intentions, in this case the intentions of the di-
vorce court, instead of the parties. As pointed out in Meehan,278 "in
[the court's] attempt to decipher the trial courts' true intentions it
would be inevitable that, as here, conclusions would be reached in a
manner inconsistent with the long-standing rule that a court speaks
only through its official orders and entries."2 79
B. A Workable Model
Any standard, rule, or presumption offered as a solution to the
problems in this area must be clear, unambiguous, and communicated
quickly and effectively. For this reason, the rule should be articulated
in a statute rather than through judicial opinions.
271. See H. CLARK, supra 1, § 18.7, at 779, § 18.8, at 784.
272. Meehan v. Meehan, 425 N.E.2d 157, 159 (Ind. 1981).
273. See, ag., Sullivan v. Sullivan, 102 Idaho 737, 639 P.2d 435 (1981); Blank v. Blank,
698 S.W.2d 623 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); In re Marriage of Lorge, 207 Mont. 423, 675
P.2d 119 (1984); Nakashmia v. Nakashima, 297 S.E.2d 208 (W. Va. 1982).
274. See supra notes 123-34 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 104-13 and accompanying text.
276. E.g., Sullivan v. Sullivan, 102 Idaho 737, 639 P.2d 435 (1981).
277. See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text regarding the various contexts in
which the question of when the agreement merged, survived, or exists as a hybrid
contract decree might arise.
278. Meehan v. Meehan, 425 N.E.2d 157, 159 (Ind. 1981).
279. Id. See also Phillips v. Phillips, 93 Idaho 384, 462 P.2d 49 (1969).
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The UMDA section 306280 provides a good model for legislation. It
favors independence of contract,281 but maintains some degree of judi-
cial oversight through requirements of approval by the court of the
provisions for spousal support.282
Perhaps the most attractive feature of the UMDA is that it relies
on a presumption to determine whether, and in what form, a divorce
settlement agreement survives entry of a divorce decree.28 3 As sug-
gested above, a presumption represents the clearest way to insure pre-
dictability and consistency in answering this question.2 4 But section
306 works logically to resolve some of the other tricky collateral issues
in this area as well.
Under the UMDA, as described above,28 5 the parties have two op-
tions with respect to their contracts: wholly independent agreement
(subject to approval by the divorce court); or hybrid contract/de-
cree.28 6 Unless the agreement provides to the contrary, its terms will
be set forth in the decree, and in that way it becomes the hybrid de-
cree/contract. 287 If the agreement does provide that its terms should
not be set forth in the decree, the decree will merely identify the
agreement and will state that the court has found its terms not
unconscionable. 28 8
The hybrid contract/decree gives the parties both contract and
judgment remedies-a valuable choice. Enforcement devices available
on the decree, such as contempt and garnishment are certainly strong
remedies, frequently necessary to ensure compliance by recalcitrant
obligors.28 9 However, there will be times when they do not represent
280. UMDA § 306, 9A U.L.A. 216 (1987). For the text of § 306, see supra text accompa-
nying note 158. In the second edition of his treatise, released during the publica-
tion process of this article, Professor Homer Clark, Jr. also concludes that the
UJMDA "offer[s] the most workable compromise" in the context of the problems
addressed here. H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 18.8, at 783.
281. For example, the terms, other than those relating to children, are binding upon
the court unless the court finds that the provisions are unconscionable. UMDA
§ 306(b), 9A U.L.A. 216 (1987).
282. Id.
283. Id. § 306(d).
284. For a discussion of why a presumption is preferable, see supra notes 260-68 and
accompanying text.
285. For a discussion of the UMDA as adopted by several states, see supra notes 160-
210 and accompanying text.
286. UMDA § 306(c)-(f), 9A U.L.A. 216-17 (1987). Complete merger of the agreement
into the decree is not an option under the U1MDA.
287. Id. § 306(d), 9A U.L.A. at 216.
288. The unconscionable standard applies only to terms not relating to children. See
id. § 306(b).
289. Congress addressed the problem of enforcement of support, and made a host of
remedies available to improve the effectiveness of child support enforcement.
See 42 U.S.C. § 666 (Supp. III 1985). These child support enforcement amend-
ments of 1984 require the states to have in effect laws requiring the use of proce-
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the most appropriate or effective remedy.
For example, a party can be found in civil contempt and jailed only
if she wilZfully violates the court's order.290 Therefore, if the obligor
can prove she cannot comply with the order, she cannot be found in
civil contempt. However, the obligee would certainly be entitled to
contract damages, since the inability to pay due to changed circum-
stances simply would not rise to the level of impossibility required to
rescind a contract.291 In many cases such damages would prove an
empty remedy, but in other instances a contract judgment might give
the obligee options he might not otherwise have. For example, an ob-
ligor who could avoid civil contempt by showing inability to pay might
later rebound economically. If the obligee has available a contract
remedy that he pursued to judgment, he would be able to enforce the
judgment when the obligor recovers economically.
Another example is demonstrated by a California case. In In re
Marriage of Lane,292 the former wife sought relief because she had
relied on her former husband's allegedly fraudulent representation of
assets in entering the divorce settlement agreement. Res judicata
foreclosed her collateral attack on the fairness of the settlement based
on the husband's fraud because the court had already passed on and
approved its fairness.2 93 However, the agreement contained a war-
dures which include income withholding, judicially and administratively
expeditious processes for obtaining and enforcing support orders, withholding of
state income tax refunds, lien imposure on real and personal property, making
available information on overdue support to a consumer reporting agency, and
mandatory withholding from wages along with employer liability for failure to do
so when required. Id. In enacting the amendment, the Committee on Finance
took testimony to determine which procedures were most effective in individual
states and designed the amendment to ensure that those procedures would be in
effect in all the states, anticipating that uniformity in enforcement procedures
would increase compliance nationwide. S. REP. No. 387, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 27,
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2423. See also L. WErEmAN,
DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 8, at 298-300; Chambers, supra note 3, at 900.
290. See Jameson v. Jameson, 306 N.W.2d 240,241 (S.D. 1981); H. CLARK, supra note 1,
§ 16.6, at 675, § 17.3, at 742; 1. ELLMAN, P. KURTZ & A. STANTON, supra note 15, at
398. Some jurisdictions provide for criminal contempt proceedings against a de-
faulting obligor, while others allow only civil contempt proceedings. Id. at 395-96.
See also H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 16.6, at 674-75, § 17.3, at 741-43. The inability to
pay defense would not be available in a criminal proceeding. See I. ELLmAN, P.
KURTZ & A. STANTON, supra note 15, at 398.
291. J. CAIAmAm & J. PERLLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 564-65 (3rd ed. 1987). A
defense of impossibility may not be based on subjective impossibility. The prom-
isor is said to have assumed the risk of foreseeable change in circumstances. In
order to assert the defense, the promisor must prove, not that she or he cannot
perform the obligation, but that in theory "the thing cannot be done." Id.
292. 165 Cal. App. 3d 1143, 211 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1985).
293. For an explanation of the res judicata effect of court approval of a divorce settle-
ment agreement, see In re Marriage of Smiley, 53 Cal. App. 3d 228, 231 n.4, 125
Cal. Rptr. 717, 719 n.4 (1975).
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ranty clause in which the husband guaranteed that he had fully and
accurately disclosed all assets. The wife was able to sue in contract for
breach of this warranty, and therefore avoid the res judicata
problem.294
Equally, however, a contract cause of action may prove a hollow
remedy, and contempt or garnishment may offer the only realistic
means of forcing an unwilling obligor to make payments. 295 Thus,
separating spouses should not be placed in the position of choosing be-
tween remedies, but should have the option of retaining both possibili-
ties, as provided in the UMDA.
As suggested above, the question of the status of a divorce settle-
ment agreement frequently arises in the context of an attempt to mod-
ify the agreed to and/or ordered amount upon a showing of changed
circumstances. Much of the most confusing law regarding merger or
survival of the agreement arises from these questions. Recall that
purely court ordered spousal support is modifiable upon a showing of
changed circumstances. 2 96 A contract, on the other hand, is not modi-
fiable by a court on the unilateral motion by one party.297 Much con-
fusion is generated when jurisdictions apply a theory of incorporation
by reference which falls short of complete merger, creating the hybrid
contract/decree. Can the order be changed without violating prohibi-
tions on impairment of contract,298 or can the contract by its survival
prevent modification of the order?299 Courts have come up with many
varieties of solutions, involving many variations on the theme.
The UMDA expressly recognizes the hybrid, but solves the prob-
lem of modifiability. In the hybrid situation, the parties in their agree-
ment may expressly preclude any future modification of spousal
support provisions. 300 However, if they do not prohibit modification in
the agreement, the court may modify upon a proper showing,301 and
the modification of the decree automatically modifies the contract.302
This presents a reasonable, uncomplicated resolution of the problem.
Limiting modification of an agreement to pay support can work harsh
results. By its nature, an agreement to pay support extends over a
long period of time, and relies upon presumptions of ability to pay on
294. In re Marriage of Lane, 165 Cal. App. 3d 1143, 1147, 211 Cal. Rptr. 262, 264 (1985).
295. See supra note 289. See also J. CLAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 291.
296. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
297. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
298. See, e.g., Sansanelli v. Sansanelli, 122 Misc. 2d 512, 515, 471 N.Y.S.2d 775, 777 (Sup.
Ct. 1984).
299. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hereford, 250 S.E.2d 45, 50 (W. Va. 1978).
300. UMDA § 306(f), 9A U.L.A. 217 (1987). Parties may not preclude modification of
child support, custody, or visitation provisions. Id.
301. The UMDA requires "a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and con-
tinuing as to make the terms unconscionable." Id. § 306(a), 9A U.L.A. at 216.
302. Id. § 306(f), 9A U.L.A. at 217.
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the part of the obligor. Over the course of time, the presumptions may
prove wrong, and the ability of the obligor to pay might change. Simi-
larly, the need of the obligee may change in ways that make the
amount or termination date of support inappropriate. However, per-
mitting nonmodification allows parties to maximize the advantages of
careful planning, and can represent fair, bargained-for consideration
in many cases, 30 3 and court supervision through the requirement of
approval of these agreements provides some control.
Complete freedom of contract is probably not appropriate in this
area. The parties may not realize the impact of their agreement be-
cause of the emotional trauma that frequently accompanies the disso-
lution of a marriage, and because the parties frequently are not in an
equal bargaining position.3 04
The UMDA addresses this problem by requiring the court to con-
sider "the economic circumstances of the parties and any other rele-
vant evidence" to determine whether the agreement is
"unconscionable" before it sets forth its terms in the decree, or ap-
proves them. What is meant by unconscionable is not defined in the
UMDA, and adopting jurisdictions have interpreted this differently.
A clear definition of what is meant by unconscionable in the statute
would be desirable.
It also should be clear that the review undertaken by the court
must be a genuine, substantive review.3 05 Unlike some jurisdictions
that apply merely a procedural review,3 06 the statute should require a
substantive analysis.307 However, this can be accomplished only if
courts faced with divorce settlement agreements in fact make deci-
sions regarding conscionability after having considered all relevant ev-
idence. This must include analysis of information beyond the
agreement itself and perhaps beyond what the parties present. The
UMDA specifies that the court should consider the "economic circum-
stances of the parties and any other relevant evidence produced by the
parties, on their own motion or on request of the court."30 In every
case, the court should require the parties to provide it with all relevant
information, including, but not limited to, their respective economic
circumstances. The court must, in every case, carefully consider this
information, and inquire into its completeness before it pronounces
the agreement not unconscionable, if the review is to have any real
meaning in the cases where it matters. This is especially true in view
of the fact that once pronounced "not unconscionable," the agreement
303. UMDA § 306 comment, 9A U.L.A. 218 (1987).
304. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
305. See Sharp, supra note 1, at 1442-58.
306. Id. at 1409-13.
307. UMDA § 306(b), 9A U.LA. 216 (1987).
308. Id. (emphasis added).
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is immune from collateral attack.309 As suggested above, our society
has not yet reached the point where absolute freedom of contract in
the context of divorce settlement agreements would be appropriate. 310
Adoption of a rational, comprehensive, clear approach such as this,
announced in a statute and coupled with strict, consistent application
of the statute by the courts and careful, explicit drafting by the parties
can eliminate much of the uncertainty in this area, thereby preventing
unfairness to parties caught in the mire and eliminating much need-
less litigation confronting the courts.
309. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
310. Sharp, supra note 1, at 1405-07, 1458-60.
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